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Moreau: Torts

Torts
by Frederick J. Moreau*
New occasions teach new duties
Time makes ancient good uncouth
They must upwards still, and onward
Who would keep abreast with truth.
Lo, before us gleam her campfires
We ourselves, must pilgrims be
Launch our Mayflower and steer
Boldly through the desperate wintry sea.
James Russell Lowell-The Present Crisis
Constantly, the bounds of duty are
enlarged by knowledge of a prospective use.
Cardozo, Glanzer v. Shepard,
233 N.Y. 236,135 N.E. 275, 23 A.L.R. 1425
(1922).
"Ph.B. 1922, University of Wisconsin, LL.B. 1925, University of Wisconsin Law School. LL.M. 1937, Columbia University. J.D. 1966, University of Wisconsin. Professor of Law,
University of California, Hastings Col-

lege of the Law. Member, Wisconsin
and Kansas State Bars.
The author extends his appreciation
to Robert Edwards, student at Golden
Gate College, School of Law, for assistance in preparation of this article.
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I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years
upon the bench, to find how trackless was the
ocean on which I had embarked. I sought certainty. I was oppressed and disheartened when
I found that the quest for it was futile. * * *
I have become reconciled to the uncertainty
because I have grown to see it is not discovery,
but creation; and the doubts and misgivings,
the hopes and the fears, are part of the travail
of mind, the pangs of death and the pangs of
birth in which principles that have served
their day expire, and new principles are born.
Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process,
pp. 166-7.
Negligence
Duty

The field of negligence is undoubtedly the one that dominates litigation in these times in our complex economic structure. There is much interdependence of peoples which results from technology. For this reason we look at negligence
at the outset. Basically, actionable negligence is simply a
cause of action that consists of four elements: a duty or
obligation recognized or imposed by law; a breach of that
duty; a causal connection with resulting damage; and the
damage itself. Many opinions on negligence begin with a
statement to this effect,l and all texts on the subject follow
the same routine. 2 And it must be true that all the complex
problems that arise in connection with the subject must be
related in some way to one or more of these four basic elements.
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1. White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H.
273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941); Raymond v.
Paradise Unified School District, 218
Cal. App.2d 1,31 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1963);
Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App.2d
374
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136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968). For
further discussion of this case, see Seligson, Insurance Law, in this volume.
2. Prosser, Law of Torts, 3d. ed., p.
146; Harper all Torts, section 66.
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This year has brought forth very significant changes in
our law, in effect modifying some formerly accepted attitudes
toward some of these elements. The court gives guidelines to
the jury with reference to breaches of duty, causal connection,
and damage, elements which are normally for the jury to decide under instructions. With reference to the existence of a
duty,3 it is particularly for the court to determine because
initially it must decide whether there is a case which must be
submitted to the jury. If there is no existing duty, there can
be no breach, no wrongful conduct, and therefore nothing
further to decide. Yet there may be cases in which the court
submits the duty questions to the jury; these are generally
cases in which the facts are in dispute, in which event the
jury resolves the facts and then applies the law according to
the instructions of the court. The point is that the jury
chooses from among conflicting facts in arriving at the existence or non-existence of a duty, but the court still has great
influence because it advises the jury as to what findings of
fact will give rise to a duty to exercise care.
The court often decides to whom a duty is owing as well
as whether that duty exists. This is what was done in Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R. CO.,4 in which Justice Cardozo held that
while conduct might have been tortious toward someone other
than the plaintiff, it would not be tortious toward an unforeseeable plaintiff; that is, a person beyond the range of foreseeability, even if such person were injured directly by conduct
careless with reference to others. As he expressed it, "The
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed".
With limitations to be noted later, the foreseeability of risk remaInS the basic consideration in finding the existence of a
duty.
3. See Matthias v. United Pacific Insurance Co., 260 Cal. App. 2d 752 at
753, 67 Cal. Rptr. 511 at 512 (1968)
stating that: "An indispensable factor
to liability founded upon negligence is
the existence of a duty of care owed

by the alleged wrongdoer to the person
injured, or to a class of which he is a
member."
4. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 59
A.L.R. 1253 (1928).
CAL LAW 1969
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With this preliminary foundation in mind, we proceed to
examine the facts in Dillon v. Legg,5 decided in June, 1968.
The complaint alleged that defendant Legg was negligently
driving his automobile along a road in Sacramento County at
the time that plaintiff's young daughter was lawfully crossing
the road in front of him, and that Legg's automobile struck
the child and caused injuries resulting in her death. The
first cause of action was for the wrongful death of the child,
which is routine. As a second cause of action, however,
the plaintiff alleged that she, the mother of the child, was in
proximity to the collision and witnessed the collision and
the injury to her child, which caused her great emotional disturbance, shock, injury to her nervous system, and great
physical and mental pain and suffering. After filing an
answer, the defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings,
contending that no cause of action was stated, as the plaintiff
alleged only that she suffered emotional distress, shock, and
fright induced by apprehension of negligently caused danger or
injury to a third person. Defendant further contended that
the plaintiff may not recover, even when the third person is
a close relative, so long as the apprehension is not for plaintiff's own danger. Defendant, of course, made this motion
relying on Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co. 6 Accordingly, a study or review of Amaya is essential to an understanding of this case, though we can note at once that in
Dillon the supreme court reversed the trial court's ruling
granting defendant's motion. The majority opinion in Dillon
thinks in terms of distinguishing Amaya, but Traynor's dissent
to Dillon rests on the theory that Amaya is controlling; so
it must be his opinion that they are not distinguishable, both
involving emotional disturbance and shock for viewing a
third person about to be maimed or killed, and that it matters
not that the third person is a child, sister, or spouse of the
person put in apprehension. Yet both cases involved a close
relative.
5. 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72,
441 P.2d 912 (1968).
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6. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33,
379 P.2d 513 (1963); Torts Restatement,
§313(2).
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A brief examination of the Amaya decision will help us in
our study of Dillon. It was a mother's suit for physical injuries resulting from emotional shock caused by fear for the
safety of her minor child, who was hit by defendant's truck
while it was being negligently operated. The opinion of the
district court of appeal, by Justice Tobriner, then on that
bench, went right to the duty problem and held that an automobile operator, as a reasonable man, should foresee that
the class of persons who may suffer harm from his misconduct includes a parent whose emotional distress may come
from the exposure of his child to injury, adding that "we cannot
hold as a matter of law that the risk of such injury is not
foreseeable in the context of present day conditions". He cites
Prosser, who indicates that most people "feel" that such a
parent should recover. He then traces historically the feudal
rules wherein there was almost absolute liability,7 until the
Industrial Revolution caused a breaking away from such
strictness and caused the movement to fault as the basis
required for a breach of duty.8 And duty simply means those
considerations which lead society to conclude that the plaintiff's interests are entitled to protection.
Justice Tobriner points out that the problem of finding a
duty is more difficult when the plaintiff is said to be unforeseeable and when the injury consists of emotional distress. He
reminds us of the famous case, Donoghue v. Stevenson,9 in
which Lord Atkin raised the nice question: "Who is my
neighbor?" That is, who is the person to whom a duty is
owed? The answer being-those persons who are so closely
affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in
contemplation when my acts affecting them are called in question. Obviously, Justice Tobriner felt that the mother was so
closely and directly affected by the defendant's act that the
defendant should be held to have had her in contemplation.
The in jury to the plaintiff is foreseeable if the defendant's con7. Weaver v. Ward, Hobart 134, 80
Eng. Rep. 284 (1616).
8. Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush (60
Mass) 292 (1850).

9. AC. 562 (1932). See Marsh's
comment on this in 69 L.Q.R. at 182.
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duct encompasses potential risk to a class of persons which
includes the plaintiff. The court lists the grounds usually
relied on for denying recovery: (a) the absence of impact;
(b) the absence of the presence of the plaintiff in the zone of
impact; (c) the absence of physical manifestations of emotional distress; (d) the absence of plaintiff's fear for his own
safety; and final1y (e) the danger of fraudulent claims. The
justice then explains themal1 away and returns to the basic
issue of foreseeability of risk-the key question-and refers
to the objections above as "court-inspired theories to restrict
the range of liability of a defendant to narrow areas". Yet
he recognizes that a boundary line shoud be drawn. Prosser
is relied on for the suggestion that in order to avoid ridiculous
cases we should require that: (a) the threatened injury must
be serious enough to cause severe shock; (b) the shock must
result in actual physical injury or harm; (c) the person
threatened should be related in some way to the plaintiff, and
(d) the shock must be fairly contemporaneous with the defendant's conduct.
When Amaya was appealed to the supreme court and reversed by a vote of 4 to 3, the whole problem was again reviewed. Justice Schauer wrote for the majority. The problem
was again restated clearly. "May tort liability be predicated
on fright or nervous shock (with consequent bodily illness)
induced solely by the plaintiff's apprehension of negligently
caused danger or injury to a third person?" He concedes that
California has not yet required concurrent impact on the
plaintiff to enable him to recover, but finds that the question
raised here has been before the court three times and in each
case the court refused to resolve it.
Schauer, in reversing, relied on the fact that 18 jurisdictions
that had considered the matter held that the plaintiff had no
cause of action; that the First Restatement, section 313, in
dealing with the question, placed the issue in the form of a
caveat, thus inviting action by the courts to resolve the matter.
This was done in 1934. No court having taken the bait
during the 29-year interim, the Reporter and his advisers,
when drafting the Second Restatement in 1960, withdrew the
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/15
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caveat and restated the rule in accord with what was the
unanimous trend of the decisions. Justice Schauer emphasized that the problem must be approached from the standpoint of duty rather than from causation; that the mother must
show a duty to herself not to be subjected to an unreasonable
risk of fright or shock from seeing a third person (in this
case, her daughter) in peril due to defendant's negligence.
And even if it might be said that such fright might be foreseeable, that alone would not be sufficient to establish such a
duty as a matter of law. There are other considerations involved, such as administrative factors and the threat of fraudulent claims. Intentional infliction of fright is one thing, but
the mere negligent infliction of such fright is another matter.
There is the fear that "extravagant credulity leads to injustice", assuming that in all these cases the fear is extravagant. Then there is the socio-economic factor. This is the
fear that such a liability would prove too far-reaching. In
fact, the court here fastened on a statement or generalization
to the effect that such a liability would be "unthinkable"; it
would be beyond social utility. So the policy should be to refuse to create such duties. It confirms the thinking of Justice
Wickhem in Waube v. Warrington/o that such a liability
"would be wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the
negligent tortfeasor".
The thorough dissent to A maya by Justice Peters, concurred in by Justices Gibson and Peek, is well worth careful
study. He recognizes the unanimity of the decisions, but
feels that this should not preclude critical analysis. The
dissent is exhaustive; it disposes of all the usual arguments
made: the requirement of impact; the presence of the plaintiff in the zone of impact; that though physical injury which
follows mental disturbance cannot be the basis of recovery
in some states, it is a]]owed in California; and that the rule
that the plaintiff must fear for his own safety is not followed
absolutely. Justice Peters concludes that in the light of
modern times, a defendant who negligently endangers a child
10. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497,
98 A.L.R. 394 (1935).
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should foresee that the child's mother may be nearby, and
seeing her child endangered, will suffer shock with resulting
physical consequences. But he would limit recovery to cases
where the endangered person is a close relative, the shock is
severe, actual harm results, the plaintiff is present at the
time, and where the shock is contemporaneous with the endangering.
In Dillon v. Legg, we must note at once that the majority
opinion is written by Justice Tobriner, who wrote the opinion
in Amaya rendered by the district court of appeal. Again he
takes up all the objections to recovery, and disposes of them
in about the same manner in which he did in Amaya. He seeks
to distinguish A maya in that it involves only a "third person,"
while here in Dillon we have the close relationship of m9ther
and child and fear for the child. But to the extent that
Amaya is contra to this decision, he overrules it. The impact
rule has been rejected in California, and that automatically rejects the zone of danger rule because it was used only to insure impact, and if impact is not essential neither is the substitute for it. He attacks the limited concept of duty as favoring the property owner, and as a device designed to curtail the
danger of large awards. l1 It was a way of limiting "untempered fairness". It was also feared that the courts would
be flooded with trumped-up claims, fraudulent and indefinable.
But in such a case as this, the mother seeing her child endangered will suffer real shock and physical injury therefrom-this will be no unreal situation.
The mere possibility that fraudulent claims may be made is
no reason for denying the entire class of such claims. Many
cases in California reveal that the mere danger of fraud is no
ground for denying recovery in all cases. Interspousal recoveries support this thinking. And the fear for one's own
11. Toomey v. London and Brighton
Rly., 3 C.B. (ns) 146. Marsh explains
how the court reacted in this case in
which a poor illiterate passenger fell
down a stairway in the defendant's station. The court held there was no
evidence of negligence to go to the
CAL LAW 1969
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jury, saying, "Every person who has
any experience in courts of justice
knows very well that a case of this sort
against a railway company could only
be submitted to a jury with one result."
See Marsh, Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69 L.Q.Rev. at 185.

8

Torts

Moreau: Torts

safety is sufficient basis for recovery without impact. 12 Proper
guidelines can be set up to prevent any undue extension of
liability. Basically, foreseeability of risk is the primary consideration for allowing recovery; this is the foundation for
establishing the element of duty in the absence "of overriding
policy considerations".13 Defendant owes a duty only with
respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the
conduct unreasonably dangerous and therefore negligent.14
The guidelines set out above will prevent the rash of cases
feared by old decisions, the majority opinion in Amaya,
and the dissents in Dillon. These safeguards bear repeating,
and include: (a) the third person must be a close relative;
(b) the shock must be a serious one; (c) the physical injury
must be substantial; (d) it must occur immediately after the
fright or shock is experienced; and (e) the plaintiff must
have witnessed the negligent conduct toward the relative.
These requirements will prevent any fraudulent claims.
The reader should note what section 436 of the Restatement provides. While Restatement section 313 considers the
problem from a standpoint of duty, section 436 deals with
liability for physical harms resulting from emotional disturbance, in terms of proximate, or legal, cause. Subsection 1
states that negligent conduct in failing to act with care to
avoid causing fright or emotional disturbance which the actor
would recognize as likely to bring about bodily harm will
leave the actor liable even if the harm results solely from
the created fright or emotional disturbance. Subsection 2
provides that if the conduct was likely to create bodily harm
otherwise than by subjecting a person to fright or shock, but
the harm still results solely from the fright, the actor remains
liable. Subsection 2 makes finding liability easier, of course,
because the actor could foresee actual harm directly caused;
12. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v.
Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282
(1952).
13. Grafton v. Mollica, 231 Cal.
App.2d 860, 42 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1965):
McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32
Cal.2d 295, 195 P.2d 783 (1948);
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Hergenrether v. East, 6 [ Cal.2d 440,
39 Cal. Rptr. 4, 393 P.2d 164 (1964).
14. Keeton, L1'Ra/ ClIlIse ill the LlIll'
of Torts, pp. 18-20; Seavy, Mr. Cllrdo~.(}
lIl/(i the Law of Torts, 52 Harv.L.Rev.
372 (1939).
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so he is liable even though the harm came through fright or
shock instead of through physical contact. Formerly, damages for fright, shock, pain and suffering, mental as well as
physical, could be tacked onto other damages which resulted
from other torts such as assault, battery, and false imprisonment. Under subsection 2, the damages for bodily harm
caused by fright and shock need not be tacked onto something
else. Subsection 3, however, finds the causal connection to
be effected if the harm to plaintiff referred to in subsection 2
results instead from fright or shock caused by the sight of
harm or peril to a member of plaintiff's immediate family.
Thus the very thing that Waube and Amaya held was not
actionable, because there was no duty to guard against such
dangers, is here held to be a causal result. Hence it was important to have Dillon establish a duty in such cases so as to
make section 436 (3) fully operative in California. With the
existence of the duty, its breach, and the causal connection,
a perfect cause of action is established.
Another great case making it easier to find a duty owing
to a plaintiff is Rowland v. Christian. 15 It presents the problem of finding a new basis for determining the duty owing by
occupiers and owners of realty toward persons on the premises.
For years, we teachers of torts simply taught that there was
one principal question involved in such cases: what was the
status of the person on the premises? He could be one of
three, namely: business invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Once
that was settled, the duty followed as a matter of course. A
business invitee was entitled to ordinary care; a trespasser
was owed no duty, save to not be intentionally injured; and
the licensee fared little better than the trespasser. He took
the premises as he found them, even though he was expected;
he was entitled to be warned about traps which the owner
knew were concealed on the premises.
Obviously, these rules evolved from the rights of land·
owners to the exclusive possession of their properties; this
was feudalism. As one moves around the Middle East and

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/15

15. 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
443 P.2d 561 (1968). For further dis382
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other undeveloped regions and notes how private properties
are surrounded by high walls, he sees how the right to ex·
elusive possession was and still is a very essential right. This
is a phase of tort law that was limited by property rights rather
than by any thought of due care under the circumstances. The
late Professor Bohlen was one of the first tort teachers to re·
fer to this formula as having "a benumbing influence" on
thinking about the legal relationships between owners or
occupiers and persons on the premises. 16 (These benumbing
influences are always around.)
The facts in Rowland were as follows: defendant offered to
drive the plaintiff to the airport where plaintiff was to board
a plane. Defendant invited plaintiff to her apartment before
they were to leave for the airport. While there, plaintiff requested to use the bathroom and was injured when the
porcelain handle of a faucet broke in his hand. What was
the duty owing by defendant toward the plaintiff under these
circumstances? This is the issue.
On the basis that the plaintiff was "purely and simply a
social guest," but there was no business purpose involved,
and that plaintiff was not paying anything to be driven to the
airport, defendant moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff
was a mere licensee under the common-law classification
of persons on other peoples' premises. In the absence of
traps or active negligence a licensee takes the premises as he
finds them. No liability attaches for mere defective premises.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion and the dis·
trict court affirmed on the theory that there was no trap; there
was nothing concealed. Yet it was true that the defendant
knew of the condition of the faucet and did not warn the
plaintiff. Under the Restatement Second, section 342/7, 18
16. Bohlen, Duties of Landowners,
69 U. Pa. L. Rev. 142, 237, 340. Reprinted in Bohlen's Studies ill the Law
of Torts at p. 160. This was written
in 1921, and it was hailed as a stimulating comment by Marsh. See Marsh,
69 L.Q. Rev 182 (1953).
17,18. § 342 of Restatement 2d provides: "A possessor of land is subject
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licensees by a condition on the land if,
but only if,
(a) the possessor knows or has reason
to know of the condition and should
realize that it involves an unreasonable
risk of harm to such licensees, and
should expect that they will not discover
or realize the danger, and
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there is a provision for a warning of known dangerous conditions. But the California courts had held that section 342
was not the California rule. 19
Another case not mentioned in the Rowland opinion that
covers the whole question is Ross v. DeMond, 20 which stated
that "it has been unequivocably stated that section 342 is not
the law of this state". The court there recognized that the
California rule, the old common law rule, has been severely
criticized by writers as well as by a California court in Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries Co. 1 The writer has raised
his own voice as to the soundness of this criticism. 2 The
court in Ross states that since Oettinger v. Stewart,S California recognizes that there is a duty to avoid active negligence
toward a licensee and even toward a discovered trespasser, as
distinguished from the passive negligence involved in cases
of defective conditions. Here one finds an effort to apply
section 1714 of the Civil Code,4 as was done in Fernandez,
but the court concluded that the law of California was still
"a Procrustean bed bounded by the concepts of 'invitee' at the
head and 'licensee' at the foot". 5
(b) he fails to exercise reasonable
care to make the condition safe, or to
warn the licensees of the condition and
the risk involved, and
(c) the licensees do not know or have
reason to know of the condition and the
risk involved."
19. Hansen v. Richey, 237 Cal. App.
2d 475, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965); Saba
v. Jacobs, 130 Cal. App.2d 717, 279
P.2d 826 (1955); Fisher v. General
Petroleum Corp., 123 Cal. App.2d 770,
267 P.2d 841 (1954). See also Ross v.
DeMond, 48 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1966), in
which a hearing was granted but there
was no supreme court ruling on the
case.
20. Ross v. DeMond, 48 Cal. Rptr.
at 749, in which a hearing was granted
but there was no supreme court ruling
on the case.
1. 98 Cal. App.2d 91, 219 P.2d 73
(1950).
384
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2. Moreau, Stone, Legal System and
Lawyers' Reasonings (Book Review),
17 Hastings LJ. 854 (1966).
3. 24 Cal.2d 133, 148 P.2d 19, 156
A.L.R. 1221 (1944).
4. Cal. Civil Code § 1714 states:
"Everyone is responsible, not only for
the result of his willful acts, but also
for an injury occasioned to another by
his want of ordinary care or skill in
the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has,
willfuJIy or by want of ordinary care,
brought the injury upon himself."
5. As to Procrustean beds in the common law, see Pound, An Introduction to
the Philosophy of Law, Chapter V, p.
145. "A systematist who would fit
the living body of the law to his logical
analytical scheme must proceed after
the manner of Procrustes." Of course
he then justifies dividing lines in order
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This was the status of the law when the Rowland appeal
came to the supreme court. The question had been considered just as thoroughly as the question in Amaya and
Dillon. The motion for summary judgment had been granted
and the district court of appeal affirmed, finding no basis
for relief for this plaintiff. There was no trap, no concealed trap, no active negligence, and still no duty to warn
under section 342 of the new Restatement.
The supreme court reversed by a vote of 5 to 2. The holding was that the summary judgment was not proper under what
the facts might reveal. The facts might show that the defect
was not obvious, and was probably concealed. The facts
might also show that defendant was aware of the defect and
did not warn, thereby violating a duty toward the plaintiff in
neither warning of the danger, nor in eliminating it. Section
1714 of the Civil Code is resurrected again and used as it
was in Fernandez to set forth a civil-law principle which has
been embedded and ignored in California law since 1872.
The broad principle of duty from Heaven v. Pender6 is also
used. The court criticizes the basis of liability emanating from
considerations of land ownership and the need for protecting
landowners. It is a heritage from feudalism. The Supreme
Court of the United States has pointed out, too, that these
rules were rooted in the land cultures that followed the
feudal system. 7 Marsh, the English writer, showed how England had much difficulty in in getting away from the Procrustean bed. Justice Peters lists at least ten exceptions which
were made to the traditional categories. Among the exceptions he lists are: (a) foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff,
Cb) the degree of certainty that injury would follow, (c)
closeness of conduct and injury, Cd) moral blame in defendant's conduct, (e) policy of preventing future harm, (f) conto make our experiences more intelligible.
6. 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883). This case
contains about the broadest principle
from which to spell out a duty to act.
7. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 80 S.Ct. 725, 78

25
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A.L.R.2d 233 (1960); Harper and
James, The Law of Torts, p. 1430;
Prosser, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 573; Marsh,
The History and Comparative Law of
Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers, 69
L.Q.Rev. 182 and 359.
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sequences upon the community, (g) availability of insurance,
(h) whether there was active negligence as distinguished from
passive conduct. He refers to Newman v. Fox West Coast
Theaters,S a licensee case in which the court exacted a duty
to warn.
The court relies heavily on section 1714 of the Civil Code
and Fernandez v. Consolidated Fisheries Co. 9 to find liability
generally. And the common-law classifications do not constitute exceptions to the general rule. The court said, "We
decline to follow and perpetuate such rigid classifications".
The proper test is section 1714, Civil Code. 1o Although the
classes may be mentioned, they are no longer controlling. The
big question is whether the defendant has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probable injuries to others. It is
strange indeed that our court has now discovered section 1714,
which has been in the books since 1872. In a sense we might
speak of the passing of an old common-law landmark.
The California court seems to be the first to take this realistic
step. The case has been sent back for a new trial, and, in
fact, is being retried as this is being written. It will be interesting to note how the trial court will draw its instruction to the
jury in conformity with the opinion. Emphasis no doubt
will be placed on whether the defect in the handle was obvious or not; if it was not, there was a duty to warn the plaintiff.
Perhaps possessors will have a duty to place guests and
licensees in the same position as they themselves are. If they
know of defects not obvious, a warning is due. The categories
will still be mentioned for what they are worth.
In Brochett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co. n the defendant held
a prolonged Christmas party on December 23, 1966. One
Huff, 19 years of age, an employee of the defendant, was a
guest at the party; he was served copious drinks of liquor and
urged to indulge the beverage so that he became grossly in8. 86 Cal. App.2d 428, 194 P.2d 706
(1948).
9. 98 Cal. App.2d 91, 219 P.2d 73
(1950).
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10. See Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal.
2d l33, 148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221
(1944).
11. 264 Cal. App.2d 69, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 136 (1968).
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toxicated and unable to drive. The defendant employer,
knowing Huff's condition, placed him in the Thunderbird
automobile which Huff was driving and directed him to go
ahead and drive into traffic. The plaintiffs were stopped at
a traffic light when Huff's car crashed into the rear end of
their car and caused serious injuries to plaintiffs. The trial
court sustained demurrers to plaintiffs' complaint on the basis
of decisions in California12 holding that the mere sale or supplying of intoxicating beverages to a person who becomes intoxicated thereby does not make the supplier liable in tort to a
third person who is injured by the intoxicated person. The
rationale is that the consumption of the liquor rather than
its sale is the proximate cause of the injury. This thinking
was extended to a sale of gasoline to an intoxicated per,son
in Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc.,13 but the district court
there indicated that it would have found liability if it did
not feel that the liquor cases decided by the supreme court
were imperative directives. But it indicated that the sale
of the gasoline could very well be a proximate cause of the
injuries. And if the use of the gasoline were foreseeable as
likely to intervene, the original sale of liquor would remain a
proximate cause because the intervening force (the sale of gasoline) would not also be a superseding cause, shifting the liability to the user solely. Section 447 of the Restatement
support this theory. The district court felt bound by Cole v.
Rush and Fleckner v. Dionne. l4 Once we note that the Fuller
case was finally decided on the theory of proximate cause,
however, we must assume that there was a breach of
duty since the question of causation cannot be reached without a prior finding of a breach of duty. On this issue, see
Ewart v. Southern California Gas CO. 15
So the Brochett court went ahead and found a real basis
for the existence of a duty on the part of the company putting
12. Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App.
2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949); Cole v.
Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450,
54 A.L.R.2d 1137 (1955).
13. 250 Cal. App.2d 687, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 792 (1967).
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14. Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App.
2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949); Cole v.
Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450, 54
A.L.R.2d 1137 (1955).
15. 237 Cal. App.2d 163, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 631 (1965).
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on the Christmas party. It found that the special facts here
rendered the liquor and gasoline cases inapplicable and not
controlling. The distinction has its genesis in the special
relationship existing between defendant company and Huff,
its employee. Essentially, the basis of the cause of action
is the undertaking to control the conduct of another, and he
who undertakes to do an act must do so with care. It constitutes a misfeasance rather than a mere nonfeasance. Several
of the cases cited by the court hardly hit the proposition involved, in that here there was neither a breach of a promise
nor a misrepresentation. The relationship between these parties
was such that defendant had assumed the responsibility for
the well-being and conduct of the minor, not only for the
protection of the minor, but also for members of the pUblic.
The minor was grossly incompetent to drive, and the incompetence was caused by the defendant. Furthermore, the most
persuasive fact is that the defendant guided the minor to his
automobile. It is the strong policy of the state that intoxicated persons must not drive. So Huff committed a crime,
and the defendant aided and abetted him therein. Moreover,
California has always held that a person who turns over the
driving of an automobile to an intoxicated person is liable for
the consequences. 16 The same is true if one turns over his
car to an incompetent. 17
The ratio decidendi of the case is that "persons having a
special relationship with a drunken minor employee, voluntarily inducing the improper operation of an automobile not
owned by them, are liable for proximate consequences of such
operation". In the other cases cited above, cars were owned
by the defendant, but here the defendant, although he did not
own the car, had control over its use because of other factors.
Thus the basic fact here is the assumption of control under such
circumstances as the facts indicate. It is interesting to con16. Caccamo v. Swanston, 94 Cal.
App.2d 957, 212 P.2d 246 (1949);
Schomaker v. Pravoo, 96 Cal. App.2d
738, 216 P.2d 562 (1950).
17. Buelke v. Levenstadt, 190 Cal.
684, 214 P.42 (I923); Rocca v. Stein388
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metz, 61 Cal. App. 102, 214 P. 257
(1923); McCalla v. Grasse, 42 Cal. App.
2d 546, 109 P.2d 358 (1941); Owens v.
Carmichael V-Drive Autos Inc., 116
Cal. App. 348, 2 P.2d 580 (1931).
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sider whether it would make a difference if Huff were 21 years
old. Suppose he had been just a neighbor dropping in and
imbibing too much?
In Matthias v. United Pacific Insurance Co. IS we have another duty problem indicating that human relationships can
be surprisingly subtle. Premises, which were rented, were in
a defective condition in that the front stairway risers were
not uniform; nor was there a center railing facilitating the
stairway's use. The owner insured himself with the defendant
company against liability for risks which inhered in his relationships with his tenants, his tenant's guests, and the public.
It was obviously a liability policy by which the insurer obligated itself to indemnify the owner, its insured, to the extent
of satisfying such judgments as might be recovered against the
owner. This suit aims to go right against the insurer on the
theory that the company itself owed a duty to the injured
person by having written the policy, knowing of the defects,
thereby perhaps making the owner more careless since he
could rely on the fact that he was insured. It calls to mind
that on occasion when one cautions a driver about his driving
he may facetiously or otherwise reply, "I am insured". This
may indicate that the plaintiff's theory is not entirely groundless.
No judgment had been rendered against the insured, and
so the question is whether there is a direct liability upon the
part of the insurer. Did it owe a duty to the plaintiff? The
court observed that the indispensable factor in all negligence
actions "is the existence of a duty of care owed by the alleged
wrongdoer to the person injured, or to a class of which he is
a member" .19 But the phrases "duty of care" and "unreasonable risk of harm" do not provide a test of universal application. The quest for such a formula out of the many decisions
on the subject has been in vain. All scholars in the field
18. 260 Cal. App.2d 752, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 511 (1968).
19. 260 Cal. App.2d at 753, 67 Cal.
Rptr. at 512. See also Routh v. Quinn,
20 Cal.2d 488 at 491, 127 P.2d 1 at 3,

149 A.L.R. 215 at 218 (1942), and
Raymond v. Paradise Unified School
District, 218 Cal. App.2d 1, 6, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 847, 850 (1963).
CAL LAW 1969

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

389

17

Torts
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 15

agree on this.20 Generally, we can say the standard is one of
reasonable conduct. See Restatement, sections 282 et seq.
Guard against unreasonable risk of harm is the admonition.
What tests have been suggested? The court reviews factors
in Amaya, among them the social utility of the activity out
of which the injury arises, balanced against the risks and costs
involved. (See Restatement, section 292, which mentions
the social value of the interest to be advanced by the conduct,
and the extent of the chance that these interests will be advanced by the conduct.) Here the activity is the writing of
an insurance contract by which the assured is given the benefits of being reimbursed for what he might have to pay to
people injured on his premises. Insurance spreads losses, and
legislation recognizes the value of this activity. This attitude
minimizes any thought that the contracts will encourage the
creation and continuance of defective premises. Hence, allowing such recovery as is sought here would defeat the basic
purpose of insurance. It would make insurance more expensive and less attractive to the assured. It would result in
the writing of policies only when there is practically no possibility of loss through negligence. And even if foreseeability
of harm were the criterion, the insurer here had no reason to
foresee that the writing of the policy would encourage carelessness on the part of the assured. If it were so considered,
it would get us into the problem of whether the negligence
of the assured would then become a superseding force. If
foreseeable, it would not be superseding, leaving both insured
and insurer liable for the whole damage. But while the insurance company may have been negligent toward itself in
insuring a poor risk, this does not spell out a duty toward the
plaintiff.
As to the claim that the insurance company did not take
any action to advise or direct the owner to remedy the de-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/15

20. Prosser, Law of Torls, 3d ed, p.
"Various factors undoubtedly
334.
have been given conscious or unconscious weight, including convenience of
administration, capacity of the parties
to bear the loss, a policy of preventing
390
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fects, the court found that generally, in the absence of any
special relationships, such as in Brochett v. Kitchen Boyd
Motor Co./ there is no duty to take action to protect others.2
Section 316 of the Restatement states that there may be a duty
on the part of a parent to control a child, and section 317, a
duty on a master to control a servant. Sections 318, 319, and
320, respectively, refer to the duty of a possessor to control
his licensee, duties of persons in charge of dangerous persons to
control them, and the duty to guard a person under one's
control to protect him against injuries from third persons.
But there is no mention of any duty on the part of an insurer
to control the assured. The absence of duty being clear, it is
a matter of law for the court and not for the trier of fact.
Historically there has been opposition to the recognition
of new duties for the protection of valued interests such as
the right to privacy, 3 the right to maintain tort actions for
negligence by persons without privity of contract, 4 the right
not to be subjected to intentionally inflicted mental disturb1. 264 Cal. App.2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr.
136 (1968).
2. The case of Connor v. Great Western Savings & Loan Asso., 69 Cal.2d
- , 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609,
decided December 12, 1968, is so
definitely within our thinking here that
it is felt that it should be mentioned
even if it extends us beyond our given
year. Purchasers of a home in a residential development in Ventura County
suffered damage when the homes suffered serious damages from cracking
caused by ill-designed foundations that
could not withstand the expansion and
contraction of adobe soil. The Valley
Development Co., which built and sold
the homes, negligently constructed them
without regard to soil conditions.
Plaintiffs joined the Great Western
Savings and Loan Association on the
basis that it had a real role in financing
the development. Plaintiff claimed that
the Association was liable either as a
joint enterpriser with the developer or
on a separate duty of care to the plain-

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

tiffs. Plaintiffs were nonsuited in the
trial and appealed. The supreme court
reversed by a vote of 4 to 3. The
majority found a duty to be exercised
by the Association even if there was no
privity of contract, since the duty may
be found on the basis of public policy.
The duty was to protect plaintiffs from
seriously defective construction, defective plans, and defective inspections.
Negligence of the builders was not a
superseding cause. The court again
reviewed §§ 447 and 449 of the Restatement. The case will undergo considerable study and discussion, and financing
organizations will have to be much
more careful of their procedures. They
will have to think not only about the
safety of their investments, but also
whether the rights of future owners are
protected.
3. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App.
285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
4. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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ance,S the right to be free from injuries created by negligently
inflicted mental disturbance,6 and the right to recover for
mental shock with resulting physical injury from viewing
a close relative negligently subjected to serious danger and
injury.7 The opposing argument is that recognition of such
rights would open a veritable Pandora's box from which
would flow fraudulent, fictitious, faked, intangible, untrustworthy, illusory, speculative, and extravagant claims. There
would be floods of litigation, the argument goes, in which
damages could not be proved even with much perjured testimony. Experience with these cases shows that such fears
have not been justified. They have been proved unfounded,
for the judicial process has been able to separate the genuine
from the fraudulent. Yet these arguments are being made
regularly by our pessimists who can still feel the stomachache
in the apple blossoms.

Products Liability or Strict Liability
As is to be expected, a number of cases have arisen in which
plaintiffs have sought the advantages of this type of liability
in which contributory negligence is not a defense, and in
which negligence need not be proved save by showing that
the products were defective when they left the factory and
have not been substantially changed since then. The most
thorough analysis of this cause of action during the year appears in Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co. s A Goodrich tire
blew out and the damages were substantial. The judgment
for Barth was for $207,375 and the guests in the car were
awarded a total of $6,000. The case was tried vigorously,
with able counsel on both sides. Anyone reading this opinion
will profit greatly in finding what procedures he should follow
with reference to the care to be taken with his tires; overloading and abnormal speeds do have a bearing on the per5. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v.
Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282
(1952).
6. Espinosa v. Beverly Hospital, 114
Cal. App.2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1952).
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7. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968).
8. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
306 (1968). For further discussion of
this case, see York, REMEDIES, in this
volume.
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formance of tires. Of course, here the company was held liable largely because it had not warned users as to these matters.
Probably competition prevents reference to the limitations that
might induce buyers to buy elsewhere. Perhaps the rare
recovery because of tire failures justifies the policy not to
emphasize these limitations. How many of us keep our speeds
down because of the pbssibility of a blowout? This opinion,
with all the expert testimony, is enlightening. Do we accelerate sharply on a curve when to do so increases danger
greatly? Overloading and excessive speeds could very well
have prevented the plaintiff from winning this case if it had
been a straight negligence case; but in a strict liability case,
only use with actual knowledge of defects operates to defeat
the plaintiff's case.
Thus we can say that the big hurdle for the attorneys for
Goodrich was the fact that their client failed to warn of dangers for overloading and excessive speeds. The failure to
warn was the defect. The facts were unclear whether there
were actual defects in the tire though there was some evidence
that such defects might have existed. Mrs. Barth was driving
a 1961 Chevrolet station wagon equipped with Goodrich tires
when the left rear tire blew out, causing the car to go out of
control and over an embankment. Mrs. Barth was killed and
her four passengers injured. Mr. Barth, for himself and their
two children, sued for the wrongful death of Mrs. Barth, and
the injured passengers joined in the suit. The car was a
company car, which Mrs. Barth was authorized to drive. In
November, 1961, the owner arranged to have two new Silvertown tires placed on the car by Perry and Whitlow, wholesale
and retail distributors for Goodrich in San Francisco; the tires
were guaranteed against blowouts for 24 months. The accident occurred in April, 1962, after the tires had been in use
for some five months. Two additional tires had been placed
on the car in December, 1961. Accordingly, all tires were
new. The suits were brought against Goodrich, manufacturer,
and Perry and Whitlow, distributors and installers. The car
had been used in business, and with a trailer attached. There
was much evidence that the tires were overloaded at times,
and that Goodrich knew that such tires were subject to overCAL LAW 1969
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loading but never advised the public or particular customers
to that effect. There was much expert testimony on overloading to show that the tire was not used as intended.
The jury returned a verdict against Goodrich in favor of
all plaintiffs, but in favor of the distributor-installer. Goodrich appealed, and the plaintiffs appealed the judgment for
the installer. Goodrich made these arguments on appeal: (a)
The issue of strict liability should not have been submitted
because the evidence showed that the use of the tire was not
as intended in that there was excessive speed, and that there
had been overloading. The court's position was that the tires
had been checked regularly and the public had never been
advised of the danger of overloading, nor of the fact that
speeds enhance tire dangers. (b) The court erred in not
giving Goodrich's requested instruction on burden of proof
to the effect that if the jury found that it was just as probable
that the accident was proximately caused by some misuse
or abuse of the tires as by the defect in the tire, the verdict
should be for the defendant. The court stated that such
instruction was held erroneous in Alvarez v. Felker Manufacturing Co. O (c) Goodrich claimed it was error to instruct
that contributory negligence was not a defense. But Restatement, section 402A, comment (n) and the cases hold that
it definitely is not a defense unless it amounts to assumption
of risk, which would mean that the plaintiff used the product
with knowledge of the defect. This is the rule in Seely v.
White Motor Co. IO and Canifax v. Hercules. lo . l There was no
evidence that the Barths knew of any defects, and there was
no evidence of any use not sanctioned, so there could have
been no contributory negligence. But it was proper, said the
court, to tell the jury of the defects, as there was evidence
of experts on both sides that there were defects. And the
word "defect" includes not only clear defects, but also the
9. 230 Cal. App.2d 987,41 Cal. Rptr.
514 (1964).
10. 63 Cal.2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17,
403 P.2d 145 (1965).
10.1. 237 Cal. App.2d 44, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 552 (1965). See also Vander394
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mark v. Ford Molar Co., 61 Cal.2d
256, 37 Cal. Rpir. 896, 391 P.2d 16R
(1964), and Prosser, Strict Liahility 10
Ihe Consumer in California, 18 Hast.
LJ. 9 (1966).
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failure to urge care to do certain things or warn not to do
other things which will cause danger. The failure to warn
is a defect. Gherna v. Ford Motor Co. n Section 402A,
comment (j) of the Restatement is in accord that the product
is deemed defective if placed on the market without adequate
warnings. ( d) Goodrich also claimed that the fact that the
tires were sold by the trade name of Silvertown prevents liability for implied warranties. But here the trade name was
used only for identification purposes, so that plaintiff still
could rely on the warranty .12 ( e) Goodrich claimed that
Barth's guests, the Clarks, could not take advantage of the
warranties because there was no privity of contract. But products liability is liability in tort and so privity is no longer
necessary.13 See also Vandemark v. Ford Motor CO.,14 where
a sister of the owner recovered; Gutierrez v. Superior Court,15
where the guest of an inn recovered; Peterson v. Lamb Rubber
CO.;16 and Alvarez. 17 (f) Goodrich also claimed that the
court erred in not telling the jury that a speed of more than
65 miles per hour would constitute a rebuttable presumption
of negligence. As a matter of fact, the instruction told the
jury that such a speed violation would be negligence as a
matter of law, so the given instruction was more favorable
to Goodrich than the one requested; so it could not have been
prejudicial.
On the Barth and Clark appeals from the judgment in favor
of the distributor, the latter's role in the distributive process
must be examined. The owner of the Chevrolet advised
11. 246 Cal. App.2d 639, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 94 (1966).
12. See Odell v. Freuh, 146 Cal. App.
2d 504, 304 P.2d 45, 76 A.L.R.2d 345
(1956).
13. Of course the leading case on
the elimination of the old requirement
is MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, III N.E. 1050 (1916).
14. 61 Cal.2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896,
391 P.2d 168 (1964).
15. 243 Cal. App.2d 710, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1966).

16. 54 Cal.2d 339, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863,
353 P.2d 575 (1960). Here the court
held that an employee using a defectively made tool could be held in privity
with the vendor manufacturer so as to
have the benefit of implied warranties.
This was pre-Greenman, which was
decided in 1963. If privity was needed,
then the court would find it.
17. 230 Cal. App.2d 987, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 514 (1964).
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Barth, its employee, that two Silvertown tires for the Chevrolet
had been ordered through a Goodrich distributor in the Midwest similar to Perry and Whitlow. Perry and Whitlow sent
the invoice to Goodrich and received a service charge for
handling the matter and $40.00 credit for the tires removed
from their stock; they also received $4.13 for the mounting
of the tires. The court had instructed that unless Perry and
Whitlow had sold the tires they could not be held liable. The
jury accordingly held for the distributors on the theory that
they had not been sellers. That is, the selling was necessary
to ground strict liability. But the appellate court held that
the definition of sale under the old terminology was inaccurate
for the applicability of tort liability. Under Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.,18 and section 402A of the Restatement,
one who sells any product in a defective condition to the user
or consumer is liable to such user or consumer if the seller
is engaged in the business of selling such product and it reaches
the receiver in the same condition. The rule applies although
the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale, and it also applies although the user has not brought
the product from or entered into any contractual relation
with the seller. The comment (f) to section 402A explains
that those liable include manufacturers, wholesalers, retail
dealers, or distributors; the important thing is that all parties
who are integral parts of the overall producing or marketing
process, or enterprise, are included. Of course Perry argues
that his firm was a mere conduit between the plaintiff and the
manufacturer. But the firm was clearly more than that, as
indicated by the fact that the tires came from their stock, that
they received credit therefor, and also that they mounted the
tires and were paid for so doing. They were distributors and
so fell within the rule of the Restatement and the cases.
A second case, also involving an alleged defect in an automobile, is Waters v. American Motors Corporation. 19 A car
again went out of control and resulted in the death of the
18. 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1963).

396

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/15

19. 263 Cal. App.2d - , 69 Cal. Rptr.
799 (1968) hearing granted August 28,
1968.
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driver. A Rambler was purchased new by Mrs. Elmore in
March, 1962, and the accident happened six weeks after the
purchase and after the car had been driven less than 3,000
miles. Mrs. Elmore thought the car shimmied, but her husband was not certain about it. But if it shimmied, it was
after the speed was over 65 miles per hour. On the day of the
accident, Mrs. Elmore was driving on a three-lane road and
while passing another car and while going 60 to 65 miles per
hour, her car suddenly fishtailed and went over the center
lane and crashed into the Waters car, killing Mr. Waters and
injuring Mrs. Waters, who sued her for her injuries and the
wrongful death of her husband; Mrs. Elmore sought damages
for her injuries.
Thus the claims of Mrs. Elmore were by a user, but those
of the Waters family were as bystanders or non-users. If a
defect in the car was established we would then have had a
case on the rights of bystanders to recover under the doctrine
of strict liability. The trial court heard the evidence and
entered a nonsuit which the district court of appeal affirmed.
In order to make a cause of action it was up to the plaintiff
to show that the car was defective when it was sold and that
the defect caused the injuries and death involved.
Motorists following the Rambler testified that some metal
seemed to be dragging beneath the car, and sparks were
emanating from under it as the car was fishtailing across
the highway. It seemed as if the drive-shaft had become
disconnected at one end, and the marks on the highway showed
that something had dug into the paving. In addition to the
alleged dropping of a part of the mechanism of the car,
there was also a claim of the shimmying of the car and of
foreign particles in the gear box. The court concluded that
the shimmying was not proved as the cause of the wreck
because Mrs. Elmore was not driving at the speed required
for the shimmying; so if there had been shimmying, it was
not relevant. As to particles in the gear box, that was not
proved. The question narrows down, then, to the alleged
defect of parts of the car becoming dislodged and causing
the wreck. The court states that the part was neither proCAL LAW 1969
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duced nor identified. So the whole case rests on what inferences can be made from what evidence is produced. Several
cases are cited to the effect that when a defect is not specifically proved, the plaintiff cannot have the benefit of the
inference unless all other possible causes of the accident are
negatived. No manufacturing flaw or inadequate design was
presented; hence the need of negativing other possible causes.
The court relies on Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,20 and
Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing,l both New
Jersey cases.
The importance of Waters lies in what it says about proving a case of this kind; i.e., it does not prove itself. Inferences are to be made, but not lightly. Plaintiff must show
(a) that there was a defect in the car when it left the dealer,
(b) proper use, and (c) that the injury is traceable to the
defect, i.e. it must be causal. It was the court's decision that
these requirements were not met. Readers should examine
Gherna, 2in this connection. It will be recalled that in Gherna,
a fire developed almost spontaneously in a two-month-old
Thunderbird when the owner had driven it to his job and
had walked away from it about 100 feet. All that was left
to infer was that a new automobile does "not suddenly develop
a fire in the engine compartment without someone's negligence". The court concluded that the plaintiff's cause could
be sustained as negligence proved with the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, or on strict liability by inference, or on breach
of warranty. But is it not equally true that parts do not drop
off of new cars without someone's negligence? Of course
as the Thunderbird in Gherna was not being driven, other
causes of the accident would not have to be negatived. The
driving of the Thunderbird was not involved, but that of
Mrs. Elmore's Rambler was. 2 •l

20. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75
A.L.R.2d 1 (1960).
1. 42 N.I. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964).
2. 246 Cal. App.2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr.
94 (1966).
2.1. Since the discussion of Waters
was written, the Supreme Court, 70
398
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A.C. 615, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d
84, March 1968, reversed the Court of
Appeal on two major phases of the case:
(1) a car with a falling drive shaft is a
defective car forming a basis for liability under the doctrine of strict liability
and (2) a third person, a mere by-
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The applicability of products and strict liability to real
estate transactions is considered in Conolley v. Bull. 3 Defendant Bull, was a real estate developer and speculator in
residential property, and he obtained a permit to build a
home on his sloping lot in Contra Costa County, then hired
a contractor to build the house. Defendant testified that he
was not present when the foundation was put in but that
he knew the piers went down 12 feet. No soil tests were
made before construction; a neighbor talked to defendant
and asked if he knew there was a slide condition in the lot,
and defendant said not to worry about it. The neighbor
wrote him a letter telling him that if any damage to his
property resulted because of the construction he would look
to defendant for damages. Defendant Bull sold the property
to Conolley, who raised questions about a culvert which
emptied onto the place. But upon being assured that the
house was built safely, he bought it. Plaintiff took possession
in October or November, 1961, though the escrow was not
to be closed until February 16, 1962. On that date, while
it was raining, a landslide occurred. On February 19, plaintiffs served notice of rescission on defendants but later asked
for damages in the alternative. A soil specialist testified for
plaintiffs that he found 2-! feet of fill on the place, and that
fill is prone to slide; he and another expert testified that in
such a situation a soil test should be made, and that it was
customary to do so in Contra Costa County. At the trial,
the court stated to counsel that there was evidence of negligence and evidence that might call for the application of the
rule of strict liability in tort as declared in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products. 4 The cause of action was originally for
rescission but it was amended to allege negligence and strict
liability. The trial court found that: (a) defendant was
negligent in building without providing adequate soil drainage; (b) as a real estate developer he failed to arrange for
stander, is entitled to recover for damages resulting from such defect.
3. 258 Cal. App.2d 183,65 Cal. Rptr.
689 (1968).

4. 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049
(1963).
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suitable drainage; and (c) he was "absolutely liable" to plaintiffs for such failure, in the sum of $9,925.00. The amendments were proper as it was simply a change of legal theory
on the facts proved. So there was no prejudice from the
variance in pleading. 5 Experts had testified that the failure
to have proper drainage caused the slide, so there was no
surprise as to the facts, and the cause for negligence was
sustained.
Our special interest here, however, is to note whether the
doctrine of strict liability is applicable to such a case as this.
The status of the law on the matter is covered concisely on
pages 842 to 847 of Prosser and Smith, Cases on Torts, fourth
edition. The New Jersey case-Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,
Inc. 6 applies the doctrine in a case where the defendant was
developing real estate. As Prosser states, "To date of publication, this New Jersey case stands alone imposing strict
liability, without privity upon the builder-vendor. It has not
been followed nor rejected. Will it be followed?" The case
has been cited many times in the past two years, with no clear
holding in accord. The district court of appeal in Conolley
refused to apply the strict liability rule to the facts of the case.
It pointed out that in Halliday v. Green,7 the court expressly
refused to hold the builder of an apartment house liable on
the products liability doctrine where tenants were injured
from a fall in a defectively built staircase. The same ruling
is made in Sabella v. Wisler,s as to liability for construction
on a loose fill, and in Dow v. Hol/y,9 as to liability for installing
a defective gas heater. In each of the latter cases the contractor's liability was rested on proof of negligence. The
Halliday case notes the differences between strict products
liability for manufacturing a product anl for construction of
real estate as follows: (a) The builder is seldom in a position
5. In Read v. Safeway Stores Inc.,
264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal. Rptr. 454
(1968), the plaintiff had initially proceded on a theory of negligence. The
trial court's refusal to allow plaintiff
to change the theory of his case to strict
liability was held to be error.
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6. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
7. 244 Cal. App.2d 482, 53 Cal. Rptr.
267 (1966).
8. 59 CaI.2d 21, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689,
377 P.2d 889 (1963).
9. 49 Cal.2d 720, 321 P.2d 736
(1958).
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to limit his liabilities by express warranties and disclaimers
and thereby defeat recovery by an occupant in a defectively
constructed building. (b) It is much less difficult for the
occupant to trace the defect in a building than to trace the
fault in a complex manufactured product, so the need for
such a rigid rule is less pronounced. ( c) The buyer of a
building can always make a very careful check-a meaningful
inspection. The Halliday case points out that if strict liability
were available, the plaintiff would profit in two ways: (a) It
would relieve him of showing the privity of tenants with the
builder; (b) All we would need to show is a defective
condition-not that it was negligently constructed. And Dow
points out the similarity to MacPherson v. Buick: 10 "There is
. a close analogy between a supplier of chattels and a
general contractor for the construction of abuilding." Although Dow flirts with the MacPherson reasoning, the basis
of its decision is on negligence. Prosser sees no real distinction between suppliers of chattels and suppliers of homes. l1
As we go to press the second division of the district court
of appeal (San Francisco) has held, in Kriegler v. Eichler
Homes, Inc./ 2 that a supplier of homes is liable in strict
liability. The court cites Prosser and Schipper.
A brief look at Harris v. Belton and similar cases13 seems
justified. Harris involves the sale of cosmetics. Plaintiff
used a widely advertised "Skin Tone Cream" which she
claimed burned, irritated, scarred, and darkened her skin.
She sued the manufacturer and the retailer for breach of
express waranty, on the basis of the advertising, and of
implied warranty on the basis that the product was not merchantable. The court gave consideration to possible liability
on the strict theory of Greenman and similar cases. The evidence showed that the product affected two percent of users
10. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916).
11. Prosser, Law of Torts, 3d ed., p.
693.
12. 269 Cal. App.2d - , 74 Cal. Rptr.
749 (1969).
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13. 258 Cal. App.2d 595, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 808 (1968). See also Cochran v.
Brooke, 243 Ore. 89, 409 P.2d 904
(1966); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 251 Cal. App.2d 689, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 398 (1967); and Lewis v. Baker,
243 Ore. 317, 413 P.2d 400 (1966).
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adversely, such people probably being allergic to some of the
ingredients in the product. But each bottle contained due
warning of this danger. The judgment for the defendant
was affirmed. Thus the decision follows the pattern usually
applied in such cases. See comments (i) and (j) of section
402A of the Torts Restatement.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res Ipsa Loquitur-in Rear-end Collisions. In McHale v.
Hall/ 4 we have a clear rear-end collision that brings into
play three basic principles of the law of negligence: (a)
statutory violation, (b) imminent peril, and (c) res ipsa
loquitur. The first two deal with liability, the third with
proof. Mrs. McHale was driving the family Volkswagen with
her three children. She was going east, intending to make
a left turn some short distance from the crest of a gradually
sloping downward hill. She stated she was driving 15 to 20
miles per hour and gradually slowed down on approaching
the intersection. When very near the intersection, the car
was rear-ended by the Hall car. Mrs. McHale gave no hand
signal indicating a turn, and the left directional blinker on
the Volkswagen was out of order, as was the brake light. At
the top of the crest, Hall had been driving 45 to 50 miles
per hour, a lawful speed. Seeing the McHale car 200 feet
from the intersection, he reduced his speed. When 125 feet
from the Volkswagen, he first realized she intended a turn.
He applied his brakes vigorously but was unable to stop in
time.
The McHales sued for damage to their Volkswagen and
on behalf of their injured child. The jury brought in a verdict
for defendant. The court instructed that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur applied to rear-end cases, but that the doctrine
of imminent peril applied in defendant's favor since he suddenly saw plaintiff was going to stop. So res ipsa loquitur was
against him, but imminent peril was in his favor. The negligence of the defendant being in issue, the jury must resolve
14. 257 Cal. App.2d 342, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 694 (1967).
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the conflicting facts and presumptions. Likewise Mrs. McHale's failure to give the signal was a statutory violation,
giving rise to a presumption of contributory negligence on her
part, so the jury could find that this failure was the sole cause
of the accident. Rarely does one find three such fundamental
principles interacting in a simple lawsuit. 16
Res Ipsa Loquitur and Medical Practice. In Belshwaw v.
Feinstein/ 6 a patient who later died was afflicted with Parkinson's disease, and Dr. Feinstein performed stereotaxic surgery,
a procedure with a calculated risk of mortality of one percent. The surgeon's technique is fully described in the court's
opinion. There were questions of why and how the plaintiff's
brain was cut and damaged during the operation, whetlIer
it was a negligently used trephining instrument or just a pulling away of the dura from the bone. But the doctor stated
it was a "possibility" that it had been cut. The doctor did
not inform the patient's wife of this possibility; on the contrary he told her the patient suffered a stroke or complications.
Only twice out of 900 of such cases had doctors cut the brain,
so the result was a rarity. The trial court gave a conditional
res ipsa loquitur instruction, indicating that the jury could find
that the injury was due to negligence if, in the light of past
experience, it probably was due to negligence and that the
defendant was probably the person responsible. 17 In determining whether such a probability exists, courts normally have
relied on facts being of common knowledge or the testimony
of expert witnesses.
The mere fact of rarity or low incidence of the occurrence
alone is not sufficient to produce an inference of negligence.
Because it is often difficult to get medical men to testify
against the interests of the profession, the California courts
15. The use of res ipsa loquitur in
rear-ending cases is well analyzed in
Davis v. Ewen, 148 Cal. App.2d 410,
306 P.2d 908 (1957), and the significance of a brake failure in such a case
is stated by the supreme court in Clark
v. Dziabas, 69 Cal.2d 449, 71 Cal. Rptr.
901, 445 P.2d 517 (1968). See also

Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal.2d 442, 71
Cal. Rptr. 897, 445 P.2d 513 (1968).
16. 258 Cal. App.2d 711, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 788 (1968).
17. Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal.2d 834,
22 Cal. Rptr. 337, 372 P.2d 97 (1962).
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have treated the fact of low incidence as one element which
may be combined with other evidence of negligence, so that
the likelihood of a negligent cause may be sufficiently great
that the jury may conclude that the accident was more probably than not the result of someone's negligence. IS
The doctrine, then, permits the jury to draw an inference
of negligence in this case. This was obviously a situation
in which common knowledge could not apply. Also, according to the testimony of the experts, all that happened was
quite expectable and calculated. So neither common knowledge nor expert testimony was available. True, there was
low incidence. Was there specific evidence of negligence to
go with the fact of low incidence to satisfy the requirements
of Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital,19 and Clark v. Gibbons?20
The court found such evidence in defendant's uncertainty as
to whether he cut the dura or whether it just tore away, and
in the fact that the adjustment of the trephine was possibly
inaccurate. Also, defendant told the patient's family that
he had suffered a stroke, which was untrue. The judgment
for $155,000 for the plaintiff was affirmed.
A more recent medical case is Rawlings v. Harris. 1 The
facts are less complex, involving just a pan-hysterectomy in
which defendant surgeon sutured the patient's ureter, causing
the uncontrolled flowage of urine. The trial court refused to
give the conditional res ipsa loquitur instruction, and the
defendant won a verdict. The appellate court ruled that
the instruction should have been given and therefore ordered
a new trial. This case seems to be clear, for the experts
were not in agreement here; they differed sharply. In the
previous case there was full agreement, and so some other
justification for the use of the doctrine had to be found.
Clark v. Gibbons2 and Tomei v. HenningS are relied on. As
the court explains, it is not for the court, but for the jury
18. Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal.2d 399,
58 Cal. Rptr. 125,426 P.2d 525 (1967).
19. 62 Cal.2d 154,41 Cal. Rptr. 577,
397 P.2d 161 (1965).
20. 66 Cal.2d 399, 58 Cal. Rptr.
125,426 P.2d 525 (1967).
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288 (1968).
2. 66 Cal.2d 399, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125,
426 P.2d 525 (1967).
3. 67 Cal.2d 319, 62 Cal. Rptr. 9,
431 P.2d 633 (1967).
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to determine the existence of facts justifying the application
of the doctrine. This is why it is called a conditional instruction. Here the plaintiff's expert had testified that the injury
involved is always caused by negligence. This was more
definite than the situation in Clark v. Gibbons,4 in which the
expert witness for the defendant was induced to make admissions by a careful cross-examination by plaintiff's counsel.
Res Ipsa Loquitur and Strict Liability. Casetta v. United
States Rubber Co. 5 involves a suit by a tire repairman who
was injured by an explosion which occurred while he was
putting a new tire on a rim. Suit was against the manufacturer and distributor, and plaintiff had a verdict against both
for $58,500. The court, however, gave judgment for the
defendants notwithstanding the verdict. The theories of the
suit included negligence of defendants, breach of implied warranty of fitness of the tires, and strict liability in tort. The
evidence in this case is detailed and complicated; the procedure for mounting tires is thoroughly examined for possible
failure to proceed properly and for contributory negligence.
But we are concerned here with the relation of res ipsa loquitur
to strict liability of manufacturers, retailers, and distributors.
We have already noted, in our discussion of Barth v. Goodrich
Tire CO.,6 that the distributor was held equally liable with
the manufacturer if he was involved in the marketing and
had a definite part in the whole transaction. The Casetta
opinion contains a complete citation of strict liability cases
beginning with Greenman. 7 It restates the usual three requirements for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine:
(a) the accident must be one that does not ordinarily occur
without negligence on the part of someone; (b) the instrumentality must be under the defendant's exclusive control;
and (c) the plaintiff must not have contributed to the accident. If tires are properly manufactured they do not explode
when being mounted. The defendants still had control in the
absence of a showing that the condition of the tire had been
4. 66 Cal.2d 399, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125,
426 P.2d 525 (1967).
5. 260 Cal. App.2d 792, 67 Cal. Rptr.
645 (1968).
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306 (1968).
7. 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1963).
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changed since leaving the defendant's plant. As to the plaintiff's participation or contribution, the parties were in a definite clash. And in such case the jury decides, under proper
instructions, whether the inference of negligence can be made.
On the basis of the thorough testimony of defendant's
experts, the court determined that there was no basis for a
finding that the explosion was due to a defect in the tire
when it left the manufacturing plant, and therefore the court
properly rendered judgment for the defendants notwithstanding the verdict on plaintiff's theory that there was a defect
in the tire.
The finding, however, that there was a failure to warn the
plaintiff of the dangers inherent in the mounting of tires
gives a basis for holding the manufacturer liable for failure
to give adequate warning of any dangerous usages which it
knows or should have known would result in the type of accident that occurred. It cites Gherna, 8 as well as others, and
Restatement section 402A. Some warnings were actually
given and posted, but the manufacturers also knew that these
warnings and suggested precautions were more honored by
their breach than by their observance; therefore special warnings should have been given, especially when safety rims were
used. The extent to which the warnings were communicated
was in dispute. The plaintiff had offered several instructions
on failure to warn as a basis for finding the product defective. 9
The court therefore ordered a new trial covering the warnings
given and communicated and also their relation to the issues
of the defective product. A product without adequate warning
is defective. Certainly Gherna clearly establishes that res ipsa
loquitur is available for proving the negligence of a manufacturer, and the jury may find strict liability by drawing the
inference from the circumstances, which is what is done in
res ipsa cases. The trial court only decides whether plaintiff
has produced sufficient evidence to permit the jury to draw
the inference, in either case.
8. 246 Cal. App.2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr.
94 (1967).
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237 Cal. App.2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552
(1965).
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In McCurter v. Norton Co.,I° plaintiff was injured by an
abrasive wheel on a machine. The court held that res ipsa
loquitur could not apply because the wheel was not in the
same condition as it was when it left the defendant's plant.
But the court issued a further caveat on its use. The basic
fact in strict liability cases is that the manufacturer placed a
product on the market in a defective condition. A defect must
be shown. Can such a defect be shown by the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur? The court here denies that this can be
done. It says specifically that "when a party relies on the
rule of strict liability the requirement of showing a defect
cannot be satisfied by reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur." The fact is, however, that the plaintiff fails here
because the defendant has an affirmative defense, to wit, the
product has been changed over the time that has passed since
the wheel came from the manufacturer. Too much time had
passed, and the product had been used a great deal. The
manufacturer had lost control, but there are many cases in
which the product has passed into the hands of others and the
doctrine is still applicable. l1 Of course, it can be said that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not prevail over affirmative defenses such as assumption of risk, which means using
the product with knowledge that it is defective, and in such
case the use would be improper and abnormal. It can be
said that strict liability can be gotten by inference from
circumstances which may be different from the requirements
for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is probably given more
liberal treatment in its use in California than in any other state.
Certainly this is true since Ybarra v. Spangard,I2 which allowed
the jury to draw the inference even against the testimony of
all persons who were in the operating room with the injured
patient. The idea is that we should make the people who
were on hand explain what happened. This was also true in
10. 263 Cal. App.2d 402, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 493 (1968).
11. See, for example, Gherna v. Ford
Motor Co., 246 Cal. App.2d 639, 55
Cal. Rptr. 94 (1967) and Casetta v.

U.S. Rubber Co., 260 Cal. App.2d 792,
67 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1968).
12. 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687,
162 AL.R. 1258 (1944).
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Summers v. Tice. 13 Res ipsa is simply a method of proving
a general allegation of negligence, and it will also support
allegations of specific negligence if the petition contains a
general allegation as well as specific allegations. 14 The dangers of its over-use prompt many jurists to call for a halt in
its liberal extension. This has been especially true in medical
cases. The medical profession would favor the theory of the
calculated risk. It is a problem of finding suitable grounds
for indulging the inference of negligence. Requiring facts
of common knowledge or expert testimony as to professional
matters would surely be adequate bases for the inference, but
rarity and low incidence should be coupled with something
fairly substantial. The cases examined here indicate a further
liberalization in the use of res ipsa loquitur.
Last Clear Chance-Looking and Not Seeing
The last clear chance doctrine makes interesting study in
California because the doctrine is designed to allow a plaintiff
to recover notwithstanding contributory negligence, and California is a state in which contributory negligence is still
recognized as a strong defense. 15 Moreover, Civil Code section 1714 provides that a plaintiff can recover for injuries
occasioned by another "except so far as the latter (the
plaintiff) has wilfully or by want of ordinary care, brought
the injury upon himself." So the code strengthens the judicial
rule. Last clear chance abrogates the defense of contributory
negligence. When is the doctrine applicable? In fitting it
into tort theory it has been said that defendant's conduct is
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also can appear
as almost an infliction of intentional injury if the act is done
with actual knowledge of plaintiff's predicament. Putting
it in terms of proximate cause relates it to an element of the
cause of action for negligence. But as Prosser points out, it
13. 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1, 5
A.L.R.2d 91 (1948).
14. Atkinson v. United Railroads of
San Francisco, 71 Cal. App. 82, 234 P.
863 (1925).
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is difficult to find any uniformity of thinking in application
of the doctrine. 16
Basically four types of last clear chance have evolved as
follows: ( a) Defendant discovers the plain tiff in physical
peril from which he cannot extricate himself. (b) Defendant
discovers plaintiff clearly oblivious of his peril but able to
extricate himself if he knew his predicament (in California
this is called inattentiveness). (c) Plaintiff is in physical
peril and unable to extricate himself, and defendant does not
discover him in that situation; and (d) Plaintiff is in peril
because he is inattentive, or oblivous, or unaware, and again
the defendant does not discover him. The last type is what
is known as the humanitarian rule applied in Missouri. But
the writer still has not found a Missouri lawyer who would
claim that if a railroad engineer failed to discover a drunk
sleeping on a track in the middle of a great wheat field, the
company would be liable. The usual Missouri cases where
there is a duty to discover are intersection cases. The progression of theories of last clear chance from (a) to (d) leads
to a situation where a defendant has the duty to discover
a plaintiff, who is innocently or negligently inattentive, and
take care of him. You are now your brother's keeper. Often
the word "unconscious" is substituted for the word "undiscovered" in describing defendant's state of mind as to plaintiff's position of danger.
Our problem is to try to ascertain just where California
draws the line: under what conditions is the doctrine applicable? Just when is the defense of contributory negligence
abrogated? In Brandelius v. City & County of San Francisco/7 the Supreme Court of California undertook to draw
this line. A passenger alighting from a cable car was fatally
struck by another cable car going in the opposite direction,
and suit was for his wrongful death. The case is clouded
because the carrier-passenger relation would place added duties
on the carrier, but the jury was to determine if that relation
16. Prosser, Law oj Torts, 3d ed p.
438.
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(1957). See also Girdner v. Union Oil
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has ended. So the doctrine must be considered on the basis
that the carrier-passenger relation had terminated. The formula announced by the court is:
( 1) That plaintiff has been negligent and as a result thereof
he is in a position of danger from which he cannot extricate
himself or escape by the exercise of ordinary care, and this
includes the situation where his danger is due to his inattentiveness.
(2) The defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff is in
a position of danger and knows, or in the exercise of ordinary
care should know, that plaintiff cannot escape. It should be
noted that it is sufficient that defendant should know that
plaintiff cannot escape; actual knowledge of this fact is not
necessary.
(3) Defendant has the last clear chance to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary care, fails to do so, and the
proximate result is that plaintiff is injured. Is
Hence, the doctrine takes effect when defendant has actual
knowledge of plaintiff's position of danger and actual or constructive knowledge of his inability to escape from the danger.
It will be appreciated, of course, that the liberal doctrine
begins when a duty to find out about plaintiff's danger is
required. If defendant knows of plaintiff's predicament, it
is not much to ask him to prevent injury.19 This can be illustrated by a case where plaintiff is walking down a railroad
track and the engineer sees him. He has actual knowledge
of plaintiff being in a position of danger-but he has no duty
to stop his train until he knows, or should know, by the exercise of ordinary care, that plaintiff is not going to escape,
either because he is caught in a trap or is totally unaware that
a train is coming.
In California the defendant must have actual knowledge of
plaintiff's position of danger, but constructive knowledge of
his inability to escape is sufficient. Once the danger is known,
it is reasonable to assume that defendant must observe the
18. Doran v. City and County of San
Francisco, 44 Cal.2d 477, 283 P.2d 1
(1955).
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plaintiff to see if he is going to save himself. And when a
reasonable person in defendant's position would realize that
the plaintiff was not going to act to save himself, then a
duty arises for the defendant to take over. If the defendant
has enough time available, and a clear chance to prevent
injury, and fails to do so, the injury is the proximate result
of such failure. With this analysis it would seem clear that
the rule is far from the Missouri humanitarian doctrine, which
places a duty to discover or know the plaintiff's position of
danger at intersections and other places where plaintiff may
be expected.
The California rule seems to be more liberal when one
can be charged with having seen what he would have seen
had he looked. And if there is a duty to look, and there
is such a duty to look at intersections, the defendant is charged
with knowledge of what a look would have revealed. There
is also the rule that one must act with due care under the
circumstances. The looking and not seeing rule is well accepted.
Now let us look at a few recent cases.
In Philo v. Lancia,20 plaintiff was travelling south between
40 and 45 miles per hour while defendant was driving west
with his truck loaded with three tons of rock. It is an intersection case, usually a difficult matter to resolve. There were
no obstructions to the drivers' views, no traffic signals, the
weather was dry and both roads were paved. Plaintiff approached the intersection and noted defendant's truck some
distance away. Defendant was not slowing down, so plaintiff
sounded his horn when about 100 feet from the intersection,
applied his brakes, and slid into the intersection. Defendant
testified that when he first saw plaintiff's vehicle it was clear
that plaintiff could not stop before entering the intersection,
but he nevertheless put his foot on the accelerator in order
to clear the intersection first. But on entering the intersection
he applied his brakes and skidded into plaintiff's vehicle,
leaving marks about 18 feet long. Plaintiff's tire marks were
20. 256 Cal. App.2d 475, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 900 (1967).
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over 100 feet long. The evidence was in sharp conflict as
to which vehicle entered the intersection first. But the facts
show that the defendant's truck would have stopped in time
if he had had brakeage for another 3 to 5 feet. Under those
facts the court instructed according to the last clear chance
doctrine, and the giving of the instruction was set up as
error. The district court of appeal affirmed. It indicated
that when defendant testified that he looked both to the right
and left and did not see plaintiff until the plaintiff sounded
his horn, he disclosed that he was negligently inattentive as
a matter of law. "Failure to keep a lookout to see that
which can readily be seen if the driver is looking is negligence
as a matter of law." The trial court gave the instruction on
"looking and not seeing"l and under the facts, this was not
error. Defendant claimed he was entitled to an instruction
on his being confronted with an "imminent peril" situation
and that the fact that he did not do what he might have done
is not necessarily negligence. The court indicated that his
conduct was properly held to have been negligent even without any such instruction. This case seems to hold that the
last clear chance doctrine was applicable because defendant
failed to observe and failed to exercise care to discover plaintiff
in a position of danger, and not because he failed to discover
if he could escape. At least by holding him to have knowledge
of what he would have seen had he looked, the court liberalized the application of the doctrine. The defendant claimed
he did not discover plaintiff until he sounded his horn. He
may not have known plaintiff was there, but he was liable as
if he had known. We are thus approaching "humanitarianism" by "looking and not seeing".
In Lopez v. Ormonde,2 two boys were riding a bicycle
across an intersection after having pushed a traffic button
giving them the "go" sign. Defendant's truck was making
a right turn at the intersection and collided with the boys
in the intersection, and one of the boys was killed under the
dual wheels of the truck. As it was claimed that the boys
1. See BAlI
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513 (1968).

CAL LAW 1969

40

Torrs

Moreau: Torts

were guilty of contributory negligence, it was error not to give
the last clear chance instruction to destroy the possible defense.
The last clear chance instruction requested is what is known
as BAH No. 205 (Revised). This is substantially the same
instruction as that developed in Brandelius. 3 Yet defendant
testified that he at no time observed the decedent prior to
his death. But a passenger in the truck had seen the boys
and warned the driver. The boys were in clear view of any
reasonably observant person. The facts show adequate knowledge despite the denial of knowledge. So here again we see an
effort to liberalize the doctrine so far as requiring actual
knowledge is concerned.
In Lauder v. Jobe,4 which involved a chain of rear-end
collisions, a truck was stopped on a freeway in the second lane
from the center strip, and the driver was picking up something
that had fallen off his truck. Lauder struck the rear of the
truck. J obe was following Lauder and struck Lauder's car.
Both cars were damaged, and both parties were injured. Cross
actions were brought, one by Lauder and the other by J obe.
So far as last clear chance is concerned, it seems clear that
Lauder had negligently placed himself in a position of danger
when he hit the truck and could not escape from that position,
and that J obe saw the Lauder car up against the truck and
not movable. So the issue here is whether Jobe saw the
situation in time to do anything about it. Lauder testified
that he was going 60 miles per hour so in six seconds he
moved 540 feet. There was a strip of adequate width on
the left to enable Jobe to avoid hitting Lauder. Also the evidence showed that Jobe saw the position of Lauder for a
distance of 700 feet. So the evidence showed that there was
a last clear chance for J obe to avoid injuring Lauder. Thus,
the thinking of the court in Brandelius is applied in this case.
In Gillingham v. Greyhound Corporation,5 we have a good
summary by Justice Bray restating the Brandelius formula
3. 47 Cal. 2d 729, 306 P.2d 432
(1957). See also People v. Walker, 266
Cal. App.2d - , 72 Cal. Rptr. 224
(1968) and Fry v. Young, 267 Cal.
App.2d - , 73 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1968).

4. 261 Cal. App.2d 539,68 Cal. Rptr.
63 (1968).
5. 263 Cal. App.2d 564, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 728 (1968).
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and concluding quite properly that the doctrine was not applicable to the facts. The Greyhound bus driver was following
a car at a distance of about 100 feet at night when he saw
something in the highway which turned out to be the body
of the plaintiff who had been struck by the car immediately
ahead of the bus. The driver, without a chance to stop,
straddled and may have hit the body, which was not more than
30 feet ahead of him when he saw it. The court considered
Lauder v. lobe,6 but the facts were different. There was no
evidence upon which the jury could find that the driver had any
chance to avoid straddling and possibly hitting the body. The
doctrine could not be held applicable. There was no chance,
let alone a clear one.
In conclusion we can assert that while the California courts
emphasize that the plaintiff's position of danger must be
discovered, the application of the doctrine approaches the
humanitarian rule because the requirement of discovery is
tempered by the duty to look for possible plaintiffs and by
holding the defendant to have seen what he would have seen
had he looked. This expands actual discovery to include a
duty to discover.
Shifting of Liability
Indemnity Cases

Indemnity is a broad term in law. It can mean restitution,
complying with a guaranty, or reimbursement; it can mean
subrogation on the theory that a benefit has been conferred
which should be paid back. We speak of indemnity actions
which aim to obtain a full reimbursement. In tort it means
that where each of two persons is made responsible by law
for damages suffered by an injured person, the one who is
only passively negligent, on paying the damages, has a right
of indemnity by which he shifts the entire burden of the
loss to the party who is actively negligent. This is a right
of implied indemnification which may arise from contract or
6. 261 Cal. App.2d 539, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 63 (1968).
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from equitable considerations. The Supreme Court of California in 1958 gave full recognition to this right in City and
County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing. 7 Ho Sing had made
changes in the sidewalk adjoining his premises, and as a
result someone was injured. The injured party recovered a
$10,000 judgment against both the city and Ho Sing. The
city paid half of the judgment and then sued for indemnity,
thus placing full liability on Ho Sing. The court distinguishes
indemnity from contribution (the latter also being allowed
in this state since the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure,
Section 875 in 1957) where plaintiff gets a joint judgment
against both tortfeasors. Here there was a joint judgment, .
but the city was entitled to full restitution rather than mere
contribution. It is a difference between primary and secondary liability as well as active and passive conduct, between
the character and kind of wrong. The ultimate conclusion
as to whether the right exists in a particular case rests on
facts to be decided by the trier of facts.
Considerations pointing to a decision include the nature
and scope of the relationship, the obligations owed by one to
the other, the extent of the participation by the plaintiff seeking indemnity in the affirmative acts of negligence, the physical
connection of the plaintiff with the acts of the actor, the
plaintiff's knowledge or acquiescence in what is done, and
the failure of plaintiff to perform what he was called on to
perform by their agreement. It is a question of fact. Herrero
v. Atkinson.s If the active person is an independent contractor, the right to indemnity should generally prevail. 9
In Muth v. Urricelqui/o the question was raised whether
the owner's right to supervise the active contractor's work
was enough participation to disentitle him to indemnity. The
court held not, on the theory that the right to act did not raise
a duty to act. Muth was both owner and the general con7. 51 Cal.2d 127, 330 P.2d 802
(1958).
8. 227 Cal. App.2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr.
490, 8 A.L.R.3d 629 (1964).
9. Safeway Stores v. Mass Bonding

Co., 202 Cal. App.2d 99, 20 Cal. Rptr.
820 (1962).
10. 251 Cal. App.2d 90 I, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 166 (1967).
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tractor who contracted with Urricelqui to do grading which
was improperly done. The purchasers of the house recovered
damages from the owner and general contractor, who sought
indemnity from the actor. The reserved right to supervise
was not participation, so recovery was allowed. But actual
supervision might make a difference.
In the recent case of Q'Melia v. California Production
Service Inc.,ll defendant, an independent oil field repair contractor, was employed by plaintiff to repair an oil well. During the work an employee of defendant was injured and
obtained a settlement of $50,000 from the plaintiff, who sought
indemnity. The injury was caused by the absence of certain
safety latches in plaintiff's equipment. Plaintiff owned the
machinery, which had no latches, and was on hand helping.
He participated as he was connected physically with the operation. One instruction stated that plaintiff's right to indemnity
would not be lost if he were inactive, unless he knew or should
have foreseen, as a prudent person, that if the machinery
were operated without the latches or some other safety device,
someone might be hurt. Moreover, the court also instructed
at defendant's request that because the work was done on
plaintiff's property, it was a "place of employment" within
the meaning of sections 6302 and 6304 of the Labor Code.
He had the duty of providing a safe "place of employment"
and of using safety devices, so he was not entitled to recover.
A good recent case is Hoke v. lordan. 12
Shifting by Finding that a Superseding Cause Came into
Play

This phase of shifting liability is prompted by some of the
cases on shifting appearing in Prosser's Cases on Torts, fourth
edition, pages 404 to 414. There is of course a change of
liability when a true superseding cause is held to be the
sole proximate cause of plaintiff's damages. It is a different
shift from that noted in the indemnity cases. In the indemnity
cases the liability of the indemnitee is founded on the rule
11. 261 Cal. App.2d 618, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 125 (1968).
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that the principal is entitled to indemnity from losses caused
by the active negligence of his agent. In the causation cases,
the liability of the original wrongdoer was real and primary,
but it disappears when the new actor comes on the scene and
neutralizes the causal effect of the first actor's conduct. The
first actor is relieved of his liability even if his negligence is
a substantial factor in bringing it about-Restatement section 440. The new cause prevents the actor from being
liable. Section 442 lists six considerations which are important in making the determination whether a cause is superseding. (a) Does the intervention bring on damage of a
different kind from what would result from the first actor's
conduct? (b) Does what happens appear extraordinary
rather than normal? (c) Is the intervening force a normal
result of the original act? (d) Is it a positive act or just a
failure to act? (e) Is the new force the result of a wrongful
act of a third person? (f) What was the degree of culpability of the wrongful act?
The writer always recalls in this connection a case which
arose in Lawrence, Kansas, in which a garageman was putting
a set of new gas tanks under the ground. He had a moving
contractor do the work and when the old tanks had been
loaded on huge trucks to be carried away, the garage owner
noticed that residual liquid in the old tanks was running
down the street which sloped gradually. He worried about
fire and called the fire chief to take care of the danger. The
chief came with one of his men, and the chief said, "Let's see
if the stuff will burn," and his man applied a match. Immediately there was a fire six blocks long following the curb
where several cars were parked. Several burned before their
owners could be found. 13 Was the application of the match
a superseding force? Were the garage owner and the contractor still liable? The chief? The city? The car owners
sued the garageman, Standard Oil Co., the contractor, and
the fire chief. The court held the parties removing the tanks
liable, saying, "the setting of the fire was not so unrelated to
13. Trapp v. Standard Oil Co., 176
Kan. 39, 269 P.2d 469 (1954).
27
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the situation as to constitute the sole proximate cause". Another match throwing case is Stone v. Boston and Albany Rly.
Co. 14 in which the throwing of the match just negligently
was held to be a superseding cause. Of course that was seventy
years ago, but even then the great Chief Justice Knowlton
dissented.
Where does California stand on this? Gibson v. Garcia I5 is
a starting place. A negligently driven car struck the defendant's rotten utility pole, causing the pole to strike a user of
the adjoining highway. The collision of the car with the pole
was not a superseding cause. Certainly the Supreme Court
of California has accepted the guidelines of sections 442 to
453 of the Restatement to determine whether causes are superseding. I6 These cases rely on Restatement of Torts, section
447, for the conclusion that the fact that an intervening act
of a third person is done negligently does not make it an
intervening cause if: (a) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the intervening act is done would not
regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person so
acted; or (b) that the act is a normal response to the situation
created by defendant's negligent act and the manner in which
the intervening act is done is not extraordinarily negligent.
This statement is, of course, the language of section 447.
Would the act of the fire chief who applied the match to gasoline be considered as superseding under this section?
In Fuller v. Standard Stations Inc.,17 involving the sale of
gasoline to an obviously inebriated driver, the court considered the conduct of the driver as an intervening cause. It
simplified the question by simply saying that "the intervention
of causal forces does not relieve earlier wrongdoers if those
forces were foreseeable." This goes back to the brief formula
of the late Professor Beale,xs who reduced the matter to
14. J 7 J Mass. 536, 51 N .E. 1 (1898).
15. 96 Cal. App.2d 681, 216 P.2d
119 (1950).
16. Stewart v. Cox. 55 Cal.2d 857,
J3 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345 (1961);
McEvoy v. American Pool Corp., 32
Cal.2d 295, 195 P.2d 783 (1948);
Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26 Cal.2d
418
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continued liability if the injury was directly, or indirectly
caused by (a) another force which was caused by the original
force, or (b) by a new force which was foreseeable as likely
to come into existence and unite with the situation created
by the first force to cause the damage.
The Mosely case,19 in which crates were negligently left
on a sidewalk and moved by an unknown agent, to the injury
of the plaintiff, presented the same problem. Liability was
sustained, but the concurring opinion by Justice Traynor
showing the relation of duty and causation is most valuable.
He concluded that liability must be imposed because "the
possibility that third persons would move the crates was not
so remote that it could not be regarded as part of the risk.
Defendant's negligence consisted in failing to protect plaintiff
against that risk." Thus he handled the question as one of
duty.
'
The court having stated definitely that sections 442 to
453 of the Restatement control the matter of determining what
constitutes a superseding cause, it still remains to decide how
a trial court should instruct the jury. The BAH instructions
104C to 104C-D are based on California decisions which
make the foreseeability of the intervening cause the issue for
the jury.20 Thus we must ask how the Restatement sections,
which now are deemed controlling, should be worked into
the instructions. Should the actual provisions of the Restatement be used? Trial courts are faced with a real problem.
What if the jury returns to ask the court what the Restatement
means?
The trial court endeavored to clarify the issue in Ewart v.
Southern California Gas Co. I by telling the jury that when
it found an intervening cause it must then decide whether such
19. Mosley v. Arden Farms Co., 26
Cal.2d 213, 157 P.2d 372, 158 A.L.R.
872 (1945).
20. Jones v. City of South San Francisco, 96 Cal. App.2d 427, 216 P.2d 25
(1950) (Opinion by Justice Peters).
Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal.2d 772, 285

P.2d 269 (1955) (Opinion by Justice
Traynor). That intermeddlers would
start a bulldozer was foreseeable as
an intervening force that would not
supersede the original negligence.
1. 237 Cal. App.2d 163, 46 Cal. Rptr.
631 (1965).
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plaintiff had shown that "defendants more probably than not
could foresee the new cause." The court was here trying
to implement the applicable sections of the Restatement. The
district court held this was an erroneous interpretation for
all that was required was that the defendant should have
considered whether a reasonable man in defendant's position
would regard it as highly extraordinary that a third person
would have so acted. Thus would section 447 of the Restatement find its way into the structure of our law. Ewart did
not go up to the supreme court. We must await future cases.

The Guest Statute
The guest statute is unique in that it is designed to limit
liability, whereas most statutes regulating conduct are designed
to increase liability or at least facilitate its proof. Current
judicial decisions also tend to increase liability as we indicated in the first section of this study. Accordingly, it is not
surprising that the guest statute's limitation on liability is
strictly construed by the courts since it not only is in derogation
of the common law, but also flies against the trend of the
times. The statute limits the rule that a person must act
with ordinary care, but the courts permit this limitation to
operate only within the narrow confines of the statute.
The California statute (Vehicle Code section 17158) provides that a guest who accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a
highway without having given compensation for such ride
cannot recover damages unless intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver is established. A 1961 amendment to
the Code further provides that the owner of an automobile
is similarly barred if he is injured in his own vehicle while
it is being driven by another. This amendment was designed
to remove the uncertainty in the law which had developed
when attempts were made to apply the statute to owners who
were not driving when an accident occurred. It had seemed
impossible to say that a person was a guest in his own car,
yet it could be that in furnishing the car, he was giving
compensation for his ride. The amendment, therefore, was
designed to resolve these inconsistencies by giving the owner
420
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the status of a guest if he was riding with someone in his
car who was driving at the owner's request.
Who Is a Guest?
Whitehill v. Strickland2 is a case from the district court
of appeal which involves the amendment to the statute mentioned above. A woman was traveling in her husband's automobile from the San Francisco bay area to Southern California. The defendant, who was the husband's stepfather,
accompanied her and was to share the driving chores. The
defendant was driving when the car crossed over the center
line and collided with another car. The woman, the owner's
wife, was killed, and her husband, who was not present in
the car, brought a wrongful death action. The defendant
tried to hide behind the guest statute, but he did not succeed.
He argued first, that as an owner, the plaintiff may not recover
because the statute prohibits him from doing so. Second,
he argued that the wife was a guest in the car when the
accident occurred, and that since, as a guest, she would have
been barred from recovery, her husband, in a wrongful death
action, would also be barred.
The statute, said the court, bars an owner from recovering
only for his own injuries, and since he obviously was not
injured, he was not barred in an action for his wife's wrongful
death unless the wife's status in the car the moment she was
killed was that of a guest. Was she, then, a guest? She
certainly was not an owner, since the automobile was not
community property. Was she her husband's guest? No, she
was her husband's bailee, which made her the host, not the
guest. But did the shifting of the stepfather to the driver's
seat change the relationship? Not at all; the driver retained
the guest status that he had always had. He had no relationship to the car; he did not own it; he did not rent it;
he did not borrow it; and he did not have charge of it.
Therefore, the defendant not the decedent was the guest.
2. 256 Cal. App.2d 837, 64 Cal. Rptr.
584 (1967),
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The owner, therefore, could hold the defendant to a standard of ordinary care because the statute did not apply to these
facts. The statute does not bar an owner from recovering
for someone else's injuries, and the person who was injured
was neither an owner nor a guest. It is interesting to consider
how this case would have turned out if the car had been community property. The wife would then have been an owner,
and she would have fallen within the limitation of the statute.
If she could not have recovered for her injuries, had she
lived, the question would have been whether the co-owner,
the husband, would fare any better. The general rule seems
to be that if the decedent is barred from recovery for injuries,
if still alive, there can be no recovery on behalf of any beneficiary in a wrongful death action. 3
Elisalda v. Welch's Sand & Graver is another example of
strict construction. The district court was quick to find that
the guest status, if it ever existed, had terminated. 5 The
parties were delivering cement from one site to another in a
new subdivision. The plaintiff's foot was crushed by the
wheel of the cement truck. The court held that if there ever
had been a guest relationship, it had ended when the plaintiff's
foot touched the ground as he got off the truck. Furthermore,
the plaintiff had been sitting on the truck's fender, and since
the statute says "in" a vehicle, not "on" a vehicle, the statute
did not apply. And since the entire affair was in connection
with a mutual business venture, it was easy for the court to
find compensation; so the plaintiff was never a guest in the
first place.
Lubeck v. Lopes6 considers the statutory requirement of
compensation. The defendant was driving the plaintiff to
the defendant's attorney's office so that the plaintiff could
obtain advice concerning her own personal affairs. An accident ensued, and the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff
was barred from recovery by the statute unless she could show
3. Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal.2d
183,288 P.2d 12,289 P.2d 242 (1955).
4. 260 Cal. App.2d 46, 67 Cal. Rptr.
57 (1968).
422
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plaintiff argued that the defendant received compensation,
claiming that by providing the transportation to the attorney's
office, the defendant was furthering her own business relationship with the attorney. The court would not accept this
reasoning. It is true that compensation need not be in cash,
and that "such compensation may consist of any tangible
benefit given to the driver, where such benefit is the motivating
influence for supplying transportation to the rider. However,
where an inference of tangible benefit conferred by the rider
rests wholly in conjecture, such inference is insufficient to
constitute compensation".

What Conduct by the Guest Will Bar His Recovery?
Contributory Negligence under the Guest Statute

Is contributory negligence a defense to an action based on
the guest statute where the defendant is guilty of willful
misconduct? No, said the supreme court in Williams v. Carr,7
although "contributory willful misconduct" is a defense.
First, there is no support in the statute for the argument that
contributory negligence should be a defense. Second, it is
generally agreed that contributory negligence is not a defense
to other non-statutory actions based on willful misconduct.
Therefore, there is no basis for holding that contributory
negligence should be a defense to any guest statute action.
The problem, now, is to determine whether the plaintiff's
conduct in Williams was ordinary contributory negligence or
contributory willful misconduct. The answer is easy if the
plaintiff exhibits a reckless disregard for his own safety, for
such conduct is an assumption of risk, and such a plaintiff
should not recover. In Williams, although the plaintiff and
the defendant had been drinking together, willful misconduct
was the issue, not intoxication. The defendant's misconduct
consisted of continuing to drive the car in which he and the
plaintiff were traveling after the defendant had realized that
the beer he had consumed, plus the long hours he had spent
7. 68 Cal.2d 579, 68 Cal. Rptr. 305,
440 P.2d 505 (1968).
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vehicle. Since plaintiff was sound asleep at the time the
defendant discovered his own sleepiness, there was no way
plaintiff could have been aware of the defendant's misconduct.
She was injured in the accident which ultimately occurred
due to the defendant's driving while half-awake. Her contributory negligence in getting in the car with him after
both had had several beers was not enough; the issue was not
intoxication. She must, in some way, either actively or
passively, have assented to the misconduct. Since she had
not assented, she was not barred from recovering.
Collateral Source Payments and Their Effect on Damages
In many cases involving serious injuries sustained from
accidents caused by the faults of others, the victims often
receive substantial sums from insurance companies, Medicare,
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, and from employers under workmen's compensation. Should such payments be deducted from
judgments recovered against persons at fault? Professor
Fleming has written an exhaustive study of the problem. s
The basic principle is that any sums received by plaintiff
from parties at fault, other than the defendant, in causing the
plaintiff's injuries are deductible from a judgment rendered
against the defendant. This deduction insures that the plaintiff can only have one full satisfaction for his injuries.
Presumably the judgment rendered is to cover all the injuries
sustained. On the other hand, when the payments to plaintiff
are made by parties who are not at fault, such amounts are not
deductible. Frequently, an employer or his insurance carrier
makes a payment by way of settlement. If the employer was
not at fault, the amount paid is not deductible. This situation
was clearly presented in the recent case of De Cruz v. Reid. 9
8. Fleming, The Collateral Source
Rule and Loss A lIocation in Tort Law,
54 Cal. L.Rev. 1178 (1966). See also
City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Construction Co., 66 Cal.2d 217, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 424 P.2d 921 (1967).
424
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De Cruz died
an accident while employed on a ranch.
Defendant Reid was delivering fertilizer to the ranch in a large
truck, and De Cruz was riding on the truck and assisting with·
the unloading, when he was killed. The employer was not
negligent. De Cruz's family settled with the employer for
$18,000, under the workmen's compensation law, then
brought suit against Reid, the negligent driver of the truck.
A verdict was rendered for $40,000, and the sole question
was whether the workmen's compensation settlement should
be deducted from the amount of the verdict. The supreme
court held that the $18,000 should not be deducted from the
$40,000. If the employer himself had ac!ually been negligent,
then workmen's compensation payments would be deductible
from a judgment against the third person defendant under the
principle that the wronged person is entitled to only one
satisfaction. But since the employer was not negligent, this
principle did not apply, and the workmen's compensation
recovery was not deducted from the amount of the verdict in
the negligence action. On the surface this seems to give the
wronged person a greater recovery if he is wronged once than
if he is wronged more than once. But that seems to be the
law.

Defamation

The year we are reviewing yielded a number of defamation
cases, and a complete survey of all of them on all issues would
require the writing of a treatise on the subject. At the outset
we have two cases 10 setting at rest the question of how the
undertaking called for by section 830 of the Code of Civil
Procedure must be made. The section calls for two competent
and sufficient sureties. The cases hold that either a cash
deposit of $500 or the filing of a bond by a recognized surety
company is a satisfactory compliance with the specific requirements of section 830. Section 1056 of the Code of Civil
10. Rogers v. County Bank of Santa
Cruz 254 Cal. App.2d 224, 61 Cal.
Rpt r. 879 (1967). Cash security deposit
approved. Brandt v. Superior Court of
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Procedure gives full recognitIOn to the adequacy of such
security. It is said that this security has the dual effect of
(a) giving the defendant security for his costs and expenses,
and (b) discouraging hastily filed defamation actions by
impressing on litigants the need for mature consideration as
to the propriety of going forward with process.
In Washhurn v. Wright/ 1 an unincorporated association,
which may sue in California, and another similar association
were described in an advertisement, as "extremist organizations founded by John Birch Society members." The court
referred to various definitions of the word "extremist" and
concluded that in the mental climate of 1964 in California
it was not defamatory per .'le to call anyone an extremist or a
member of the John Birch Society. In such cases it is the
function of the court to construe alleged defamatory language
in a sense that is natural and obvious, and in a way in which
the persons to whom it is communicated would be likely to
understand it. Of course alleged membership in the Communist party, or communist affiliation, or sympathy for Communism is defamatory per .'le. So it is logical to conclude
that alleged membership in the John Birch Society, which
opposes Communism, will' not subject a person to hatred,
contempt, and ridicule and cause him to be shunned or
avoided.
Stoneking v. Brigg.'l12 arose out of the troubles of a local
labor union. Plaintiff had been president of the local, and
some members reported to the international organization that
things were going out of control; as a result the management
of the local was put under the trusteeship of the parent organization. Defendant Briggs, a member of the local, reported to
various newspapers that President Stoneking and Secretary
Baum had been relieved of their positions. As a result of
Briggs' statements, five articles appeared in bay area newspapers concerning the trusteeship, the removal of Stoneking,
and statements attributed to Briggs to the effect that Stoneking
and Baum had been removed for internal reasons, that the
11. 261 Cal. App.2d 7H9, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 224 (1968).
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objective was to put the direction of the local in the hands of
new leadership to bring order out of chaos, that there had
been violations of federal and union laws, and that Stoneking
had been under observation for some time. Briggs made
similar statements to several reporters.
The court instructed that the statements could have two
meanings, one harmless, the other defamatory, and left it to
the jury to make the finding. It also instructed that the jury
could consider the insinuations that could be made from the
words used, such as that officers Stoneking and Baum were the
cause of the abuses, and that their elimination from office
had been crucial to the solution of the difficulties. These
matters were to be judged by the jury "by the natural and
probable effect upon the mind of the average reader." The
sting of the accusation was that Stoneking had failed to act
for the best interests of the union and was grossly incompetent
in his capacity as president. So the charge was clearly related
to prohibitions under section 46(3) of the Civil Code. The
code definitions of slander are very broad and have been
held to include almost any language which on its face has a
natural tendency to injure a person's reputation either generally or with respect to his occupation. What is said is
construed from the expressions and from the whole scope
and apparent object of the writer. See MacLeod v. Tribune
Publishing CO. 13
Some of the matters alleged in Stoneking were in fact true
and admitted by the plaintiff. There were internal troubles
in the local's affairs, and the trusteeship had followed the
removal of the plaintiff from his position. But there were
inaccuracies which could not be termed minor, and the insinuations were the result of the inaccuracies. The jury could
appraise the entire situation and conclude that average persons
of ordinary intelligence would attribute defamatory insinuations to defendant's statements, and that such insinuations
were not true. And the record supports this conclusion. Thus
13. 52 Cal.2d 536, 343 P.2d 36
( \959).
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we see that true statements may lead to liability because of the
insinuations that follow therefrom.
Defendant raised the issue of privilege. He recognized
that the privilege is conditional on its use for proper purposes,
and on the absence of malice. The defendant pointed out
that since the jury did not assess any punitive damages, it
did not find any malice. The court found the claim to be
a nonsequitur. The fact that the jury did not award punitive
damages does not necessarily negate the finding of malice.
And there was no finding as a matter of law that there was
no malice for if that had been the case, the evidence of the
wealth of the parties would not have been admissible. It is
not clear from the opinion whether the matter of excessive
publication was presented to the jury. On that basis alone
it would seem that the conditional privilege was lost. How
could such publication to several newspapers be considered
otherwise than excessive? Words said to members of the
union would be clearly privileged. This is implied by the
court when it points out that Briggs ought to have anticipated
republication of statements made to inquiring reporters. And
of course the greatest source of damage to plaintiff was this
wide republication. Its only purpose could be to hurt the
plaintiff. It was an abuse of a conditional privilege. Restatement of Torts, sections 593 and 599.
The subject of damages is well-reviewed. The jury allowed
compensatory damages in the sum of $22,000, a substantial
sum. A motion for a new trial was made on the basis that
the amount allowed showed passion and prejudice. The trial
court considered the matter very carefully and denied the
motion, pointing out that: (a) there is no accurate standard
in such cases; (b) the award was within the area of discretion;
(c) no change should be made unless the allowance is grossly
excessive and obviously due to passion and prejudice. The
facts showed the life history of the plaintiff, his long-time
membership of the local and his membership in a number of
CIVIC organizations.
He was shunned by friends of long
standing, was the object of unfriendly remarks, and found
it more difficult to obtain jobs in his trade as a carpenter.
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We should note, too, that the supreme court denied a hearing
in the case, but that Justice Traynor was in favor of granting
the rehearing.
In di Giorgio Corporation v. Valley Labor Citizen/ 4 an
article written by defendant Jeff Boehm was published in the
Union Gazette of the Olympic Press and circulated in Santa
Clara County. A chap by the name of Galarza, an employee
of labor organizations, had furnished materials to Boehm.
Boehm's article falsely charged the plaintiff and a congressman
with faking a congressional hearing report and using this
report against union organization of farm workers. Thus,
this was all prepared by a labor man on behalf of labor.
When the article appeared in the Union Gazette, Galarza sent
a copy to the defendant Valley Labor Citizen, and it was
republished. Boehm had nothing to do with this republication, unlike the situation in the previous case in which Briggs
made his statements to reporters and so obviously intended
the republications for which he was held liable. Briggs not
only foresaw republication, but intended and caused it. So
in this case the question was whether a joint judgment against
Boehm and the Valley Labor Citizen could stand. Of course
anyone republishing a defamatory statement is liable for so
doing even if he states the source of his information. But
whether the originator should be liable for the republication
is a different question. Of course, if the originator intends,
or perhaps if he clearly foresees, the republication, he may be
held liable. 15 But here there was no claim that Boehm was
in any way tied up with Valley. Galarza was the moving
force all along, and Boehm was merely his tool. The court
thus held that the joint judgment could not stand. Moreover,
Boehm's newspaper was not asked to retract, so only special
damages could be recovered against him.
It must be noted that Valley was asked to retract, but it
refused after consultation with Boehm and Union Gazette.
This retraction had no effect on Boehm's liability as this must
14. 260 Cal. App.2d 268, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 82 (1968).
15. See Siemon v. Finkle, 190 Cal.

611, 213 P. 954 (1923); see also Curley
v. Vick, 211 Cal. App.2d 670, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 501 (1963).
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be determined by what happened before the publication. The
retraction only affects the damages. If it is refused, more
damages are recoverable. If plaintiff pleads and proves a
demand for a retraction which is refused, he may recover
general and punitive damages in addition to special damages.
To recover punitive damages, he must still prove actual malice.
The court concludes that a writer in the position of Boehm
could not be held for general and punitive damages unless
his newspaper was given a chance to retract and then refused.
Here the Union Gazette, for which Boehm worked, had not
been asked to retract; hence Boehm could not be held to the
verdict rendered. To do so would circumvent the retraction
statute, Civil Code, section 48a. The court then held that
the verdict for plaintiff against Valley could not be separated
from that against Boehm, and therefore the whole case must
be reversed. It was a single verdict, and there was no way
for deciding the respective responsibilities.
Envisaging a new trial against the Valley Labor Citizen,
the court called attention to the possibility of a further limitation on the liability of newspapers and radio stations by virtue
of the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, notably New York Times Co. v. Sullivan/ 6 denying
liability unless plaintiff proves actual malice, evidenced by
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. Curtis
Publishing Co. v. ButtsI7 extended this concept to public
figures so that there can be no recovery unless there is a showing of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigating and reporting
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Valley
Labor Citizen should be prepared to assert the constitutional
privilege granted by these recent decisions. This is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and proved. IS One plaintiff is a congressman, making him a government figure, giving
the defendant the special privilege granted under the First and
16. 376 U.S. 254, 11 L.Ed.2d 686,
84 S.O. 7JO, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964).
17. 388 U.S. J30, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094,
87 S.O. J 975 (1967).
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Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
And so the Amendments to the United States Constitution
and the United States decisions are introduced as "higher law"
which will henceforth be of controlling force in California
libel law when government officials and public figures are
plaintiffs.
Privilege

The subject of privilege is a very common one in tort law.
We find it in self-defense, defense of property, necessity and
in all forms of self-help. Whenever we find it, we are confronted with the making of a compromise. All privilege is
based on compromise. We have to make a choice from two
desirable ends. The less desirable end yields to the more
desirable. We act like Brutus-not that he loved Caesar
less, but that he loved Rome more. 19 So when granting great
privileges we must find the reason for granting them. The
retraction laws of California in effect extend the privilege to
publish without fear of large general damages, recovery being
limited to special damages listed in the statute.
It is well to note that the Constitution of California, Article
I, section 9, on liberty of speech and of the press provides that
"[ e ]very citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press." (Emphasis added.) The
First Amendment to the United States Constitution tells us
that Congress shall pass no law abridging the freedom of
speech and of the press. And the Fourteenth Amendment is
a similar limitation of the states' power to pass laws abridging
the privileges of the citizens of the United States. These two
amendments form the foundation of Justice Black's theory
that the press should be free to publish even when motivated
by malice. Should such extreme privileges be granted? We
naturally look for the purpose of such an absolute right to
injure citizens. Such an invasion of rights must be justified.
19. Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act
III, scene 2.
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What is the most desirable end? In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,20 Justice Brennan refers to "our profound commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials." In Butts! the
court stated that even as to public figures "our citizenry has a
legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such
persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited
debate about their involvement in public issues and events is
as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials.''' The people
of any country, but especially of a democracy, must be
thoroughly informed on all issues. Justices Black and Douglas
insist that our forefathers saw this and accordingly placed in
the Constitution these absolute privileges to criticize and comment and even to publish false facts, known to be false.
Our forefathers knew from experience how governments
encroached on peoples' rights. Even in Shakespeare's day,
there was no bill of rights. In fact a contemporary of his,
Sir Edward Coke, was the leader in the movement to make
kings observe the laws. He fought for the Petition of Rights
in 1628, but the Petition itself did not get recognition until
1689. About the same time, 1688, Pufendorf in Vienna was
publishing his monumental work on natural law in which he
states that to make a king subject to law is to deny his kingship.
So the Bill of Rights was in effect a dike to prevent the overflow
of autocratic power.
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Poland, and the new edicts of Franco tell us about
the great need of checking autocratic power today. The
people must be informed. Justice Black is probably right.
Our forefathers must have meant it when they said that "no
laws should be passed."
The writer has special interest in New York Times because
the court relied on an opinion written by a great Kansas jurist
in the year 1908. 2 Justice Burch of Kansas was a most
20. 376 U.S. 254, II L.Ed.2d. 686,
84 S.Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964).
1. 388 U.S. 130, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094,
87 S.Ct. 1975 (1967).
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scholarly jurist.
His opinion in Coleman is long and thorough.
It is a treatise on libel. It was a case of misstatement of
a fact by a newspaper about a candidate for state office.
Justice Burch held that there was no cause of action unless
actual malice was proved. Justice Brennan in New York
Times quotes him at length. Professor Llewellyn in his last
work, The Common Law Tradition, refers to Burch as one
of the great jurists of the country. In the early thirties the
American Law Institute was writing what are sections 598 and
606 of the Restatement of Torts, and Justice Burch was a
member of the committee working with the Reporter, who at
that time was Professor Bohlen of Pennsylvania. Justice
Burch suggested to this writer that he would appreciate any
help possible in getting the Coleman case approved as the
acceptable principle for the Restatement. This writer demurred for two reasons. First, he preferred the majority rule
which is now section 598; and, second, it would have meant
opposing the advocate of the accepted rule, the late Learned
Hand, distinguished federal judge. It is sad that New York
Times did not come about before Burch's death. It was
Burch's position that the public official cases are governed
by the fundamental principle that anyone with an interest to
protect should be privileged to misstate facts honestly to another person with the same interest. A church member can
speak falsely about a member to another member as long as
he is not motivated by malice. So a citizen should be likewise
privileged to speak to another citizen about a third person
who aspires to perform public functions. One quote from
Burch-"In measuring the extent of a candidate's profert of
character, it should always be remembered that the people
have good authority for believing that grapes do not grow on
thorns, nor figs on thistles." It is fun to ask a law class if
that means anything. A logician can make observations.
Burch's opinion was prophetic. The case should be returned
to the casebooks.
The applicability of the great privilege was again before the
Supreme Court of the United States in St. Amant v. Thomp28
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son. St. Amant was a candidate for office in Louisiana, and
in the course of a campaign speech he read a series of questions that he had put to a member of the Teamsters' Union
and the answers given. The answers implicated Thompson,
a deputy sheriff from Baton Rouge. Thompson immediately
brought suit, claiming that the publication imputed "gross
misconduct and inferred conduct of a most nefarious nature."
Thompson recovered judgment for $5,000; the intermediate
Louisiana court of appeal reversed because the record did not
show that St. Amant had acted with actual malice, as required
by New York Times. The highest court of Louisiana reversed
again on the theory that there was an adequate showing of
reckless activity to satisfy the New York Times rule.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the privilege prevented recovery as there was no adequate showing of
malice; Justice Fortas wrote a vigorous dissent, as he did in
Time, Inc. v. Hill,4 a case involving the right to privacy,
insisting that there were still remnants of individual rights
which were entitled to recognition.
We are now ready to glance at the one California case
involving these principles. Cepeda v. Cowles Magazine! was
a suit brought by the well-known baseball star, formerly with
the San Francisco Giants and the St. Louis Cardinals.
He sued Cowles Publishing Co. for saying in its magazine,
Look, that Cepeda was in "doghouse status" with his bosses,
was not a team man and blamed everybody but himself when
things went wrong. The federal trial judge in San Francisco
had ruled for the defendant, entering summary judgment.
Plaintiff appealed and the U. S. Court of Appeals reversed,
stating that what Was written was not comment but factual
statements which were actionable per se if not privileged.
Hence no allegation or proof of special damages was necessary.
This was not comment or criticism which would have been
more easily privileged. The case was sent back for trial.

3.
S.Ct.
4.
S.Ct.
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390 U.S. 727, 20 L.Ed.2d 262, 88
1323 (1968).
385 U.S. 374, 17 L.Ed.2d 456, 87
534 (1967).

5. 392 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. [1968]).
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The jury found for the defendant, and the case went up for
a second appeal.
Since the matter involved stating facts about Cepeda, the
only question was whether there was a privilege to state false
facts about a prominent baseball player. There was such a
privilege under Butts, but recovery could be made if plaintiff
could show actual malice. Cepeda was a public figure and
Butts, in between the two trials, extended the same privilege to
publication with respect to public figures as to public officials.
So the Butts decision cast real hurdles for Cepeda to overcome.
He was not able to establish that the defendant had acted with
actual malice or that he had knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for whether the statement was true or false. In
Butts a slightly less rigid showing needed to be made than in
New Yark Times, for it was sufficient for the plaintiff to win
if he showed that the defendant had been guilty of "highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from
standards of investigating and reporting ordinarily adhered
to by responsible publishers." At any rate when the case
came up for trial, Butts had been decided so the "higher law"
had come into the picture.
Because Butts had just been decided, in the second trial
Cepeda now had to show facts meeting the Butts standards
recited above. The jury found for the defendant and on
appeal to the circuit court, the judgment was affirmed. Judge
Madden, who wrote the opinion, gave a concise and thorough
resume of the situation. He noted how Justice Frankfurter
had indicated only 12 years before that the federal amendments had no bearing on libel cases, but that now, under the
cases reviewed, the burden was on the plaintiff to prove actual
malice or extreme departure from standards of investigation
and reporting on the part of the defendant, and that the
evidence supported the jury's finding that plaintiff had failed
to establish his case. His summary as to how the Supreme
Court divided on the issue is concise. The Chief Justice would
use only the test given in Times v. Sullivan; Justices Black and
Douglas would make the privilege absolute. Madden refers
to the Butts test as relatively liberal in the direction of recovery.
He points out that the instruction based on Justice Harlan's
CAL LAW 1969
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language in Butts should not have been given since Harlan's
proposed test had been rejected by the majority of the Supreme
Court. So we now have new privileges for the press.
In Hayward v. Watsonville Register-Pajaronian and Sun,6
we have an illustration of the privilege of a newspaper to make
"a fair and true report in a public journal" of a judicial
proceeding. This is the language of part of section 47 of the
Civil Code, which lists the publications that are privileged.
Here the newspaper published a report on Hayward based
on police and FBI reports, revealing that: (1) Hayward was
arrested on a warrant, issued by the police department, charging grand theft of $3300 worth of furniture; (2) police found
$3300 worth of furniture that had not been charged to him;
( 3) the store of which Hayward was manager had moved to
repossess some furniture which he had charged; and (4)
police records show that Hayward previously served a term
in a Kansas prison on a check charge. Hayward brought
suit for libel, alleging that not one of these statements was
true.
There are two questions involved. First, was this a
report of a judicial proceeding and, second, was it a "fair
and true" report? The courts take a broad view of the
meaning of "judicial proceeding.»7 In Hayward, the court
cites cases where the oral statements of district attorneys,
sheriffs, and police officers were held to be qualifiedly privileged under Civil Code, section 47; therefore crime reports of
a police department and FBI identification records should also
be privileged under the code.
The FBI report showed:
Name
Arrested
Disposition
and Number
or Received Charge
Leslie Hayward
7-5-39
Forgery
1 to 10 years
in the K.S.I.R.
paroled.
6. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
295 (1968).
7. Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal.2d
375, 295 P.2d 405 (1956); Kurata v.
Los Angeles News Publishing Co., 4
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Actually the facts were: Hayward pleaded guilty to a charge
of forgery in the second degree; he was sentenced to a term
of not less than ten years at hard labor in the Kansas State
Industrial Reformatory; he was placed in the custody of the
sheriff of Rice County until he could be taken to the reformatory; and later that same day he applied for a parole or probation which was granted to take effect on July 24. There was
no showing that he spent any part of the eleven-day period
following the trial in the Kansas State Industrial Reformatory.
The court found that what the defendant said about the
plaintiff based on this FBI record was a "fair and true report
of a judicial proceeding" within the meaning of Civil Code
section 47.
It should be noted that for each item, the defendant indicated the source of the information. This is very important.
The court emphasized such words as "police said" and "police
records show." Instead of the word "forgery" the defendant
used the words "check charge." This is a distinction without
a difference. But certainly it is important to indicate the
source in each case.
Additional phases of tort law that might have been examined
would include contributory negligence and assumption of
risk, fraud, right to privacy, conversion, and false imprisonment. Some of these have been touched upon in connection
with problems to which they were related. They can be given
more emphasis in future articles.

*
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